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CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK*

T

HE SEVENTH CIRCUIT decided civil liberties cases last year involving

2
such diverse issues as immunity from suit,' measure of damages,
implied causes of action, 3 housing discrimination, 4 employment discrimina8
7
tion,5 rights of public employees, 6 rights of prisoners, freedom of speech,
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. J.D., University
of Chicago; member of the Illinois and Texas Bar. The diversity of the separate parts of this
paper required me to seek advice from many of my colleagues. Andrew Greeley, Joseph
Kattan, Stanley Katz, Philip Kurland, Bernard Meltzer, Antonin Scalia, and Geoffrey Stone
provided helpful comments on all or parts of intermediate drafts. William McCready, Teresa
Sullivan and David Tracy introduced me to the sociological and theological literature cited in
the section on Catholic schools. Frank Lerman of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
introduced me to the political science literature cited in the section on municipal immunity. Paul
Beach, Richard Deremer and Nancy Shurlow provided research assistance.
1. Love v. Waukesha Joint School Dist. No. 1, Bd. of Educ., 560 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1977)
(employment discrimination claim); McDonald v. Illinois, 557 F.2d 596 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
98 S. Ct. 508 (1977) (various defendants); Bond v. Stanton, 555 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977) (claim
for attorneys' fees); Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1977) cert. denied 46 U.S.L.W.
3586 (U.S. March 20, 1978) (No. 77-121) (prison officials); Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172
(7th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub. nom. Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978) (judge); Jordan v.
Trainor, 551 F.2d 152, modified on rehearingen banc, 563 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted
sub nom. Quern v. Jordan,!46 U.S.L.W. 3541!(U.S. Feb. 28, 1978) (No. 77-841) (state); Askew
v. Bloemker, 548 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1976) (drug enforcement agents).
2. Crumble v. Blumthal, 549 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1977) (housing discrimination); Piphus v.
Carey, 545 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 1042 (1978) (denial of hearing) (suspension
from school).
3. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir.), cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W.
3438 (U.S. Dec. 28, 1977) (No. 77-926) (Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972); Coates v.
Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1977) (Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964);
Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Authority, 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977) (Rehabilitation Act).
4. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 752 (1978) (exclusionary zoning); Crumble v. Blumthal, 549
F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1977) (sale of single family home).
5. Pearson v. Furnco Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1977) (sufficiency of application); Guse v. J.C. Penney, Inc., 562 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1977) (pregnancy); Love v. Waukesha
Joint School Dist. No. 1, Bd. of Educ., 560 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1977) (pregnancy); EEOC v.
United Airlines, Inc., 560 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1977) (seniority system); Barnes v. Callaghan &
Co., 559 F.2d 1102 (7th Cir. 1977) (sufficiency of proof); United States v. City of Chicago, 558
F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1977) (police department); Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277
(7th Cir. 1977) (sufficiency of proof); Waters v. Furnco Constr. Co., 551 F.2d 1085 (7th Cir.),
cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 632 (1977) (sufficiency of proof); Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542
F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 919 (1977) (back pay).
6. Andre v. Board of Trustees of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98
S. Ct. 727 (1978) (residence requirement); Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d 825 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 513 (1977) (right to run for office) (policy making employee); COP v. City of
Chicago, 547 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1977) (disciplinary procedures); Kaplan v. Corcoran, 545 F.2d
.1073 (7th Cir. 1976) (right to patent).
7. United States ex rel. Sims v. Sielaff, 563 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1977) (parole revocation);
Reddin v. Israel, 561 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977) (effect of detainer); Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625
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freedom to petition, 9 freedom of religion,' 0 equal protection," due process, 12 association with one's family, 13 Younger abstention,14 police brutality, 15 res judicata,' 6 the effect of pardons,' 7 the right to travel,'" and the
contract clause.' 9 Because civil rights and civil liberties is far too broad a
field to meaningfully review in an article of reasonable length, only a few of
the more important cases can be discussed. Cases concerning judicial
immunity, municipal immunity, and church labor relations have been
selected.
I.
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY-SPARKMAN V. MCFARLIN

The traditional formulation of the limits of judicial immunity is poorly
defined, ill-considered, and only slightly related to the policies underlying
the immunity or to the results in actual cases. 2° The normal statement of the
rule has been that a judge is immune from liability for all judicial acts except
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 491 (1977) (disciplinary hearing); Cox v. Benson, 548 F.2d 1186
(7th Cir. 1977) (probation revocation); French v. Heyne, 547 F.2d 994 (7th Cir. 1976) (free
speech and equal protection); Aikens v. Lash, 547 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1976) (hearing before
transfer).
8. Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d 825 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 513 (1977) (public
employee); Amato v. Divine, 558 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1977) (obscenity); Fadell v. Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co., 557 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 508 (1977) (libel); French v.
Heyne, 547 F.2d 994 (7th Cir. 1976) (prisoners).
9. Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct.
533 (1977).
10. Catholic Bishop v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1231
(1978).
11. Andre v. Board of Trustees of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98
S. Ct. 727 (1978) (public employee residence requirement); Barter v. United States, 550 F.2d
1239 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1239 (1978) (marriage penalty in federal income tax);
Miller v. Carter, 547 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1977), aff'd by an equally divided court, 98 S. Ct. 786
(1978) (right to chauffeur's license) (attack on irrebuttable presumption analysis); French v.
Heyne, 547 F.2d 994 (7th Cir. 1976) (prisoners).
12. United States ex rel. Sims v. Sielaff, 563 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1977) (parole revocation);
United States v. Brugger, 549 F.2d 2 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 919 (1977); Cox v.
Benson, 548 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1977) (grant of parole); Miller v. Carter, 547 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir.
1977), aff'd by an equally divided court, 98 S. Ct. 786 (1978) (attack on irrebuttable presumption
analysis); COP v. City of Chicago, 547 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1977) (police discipline); Aikens v.
Lash, 547 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1976) (transfer of prisoners).
13. Drollinger v. Milligan, 552 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1977) (grandparent).
14. Id. (attack on condition of probation) (state defendant and her father-in-law).
15. Davis v. Murphy, 559 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1977).
16. Grossgold v. Supreme Court of Illinois, 557 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1977) (challenge to
disbarment).
17. Id. (disbarment for pardoned conduct).
18. Andre v. Board of Trustees of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98
S. Ct. 727 (1978) (public employee residence requirement).
19. Id.
20. My thinking on judicial immunity was stimulated by J.R. Block's student paper,
Judicial Immunity: History, Policy, and Recent Cases, submitted in my seminar on governmental immunities. My views on immunity issues generally have been sharpened by conversations
with Joseph Kattan.
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those done in clear absence of jurisdiction. Judge Swygert, writing for the
Seventh Circuit in Sparkman v. McFarlin,2 1 applied a modified version of
this traditional formulation; he assumed that "jurisdiction" referred only to
subject matter jurisdiction. The resulting standard seemed to require immunity for the defendant judge, but the Seventh Circuit managed to impose
liability.
While this article was being printed, the Supreme Court reversed,
accepting and relying on Judge Swygert's modification of the traditional
test .22 Unfortunately, neither court noticed that it was modifying, or at least
resolving a dispositive ambiguity in, the traditional formulation.
A.

The Facts

Sparkman arose on motion to dismiss; the facts alleged are egregious.
Defendant McFarlin is the mother of plaintiff Linda Sparkman. In 1971,
when Linda was fifteen years old, McFarlin sought a court order authorizing
Linda's sterilization. McFarlin's attorney presented a document to defendant Stump, an Indiana Circuit Court judge, entitled "Petition to Have Tubal
Ligation Performed on a Minor and Indemnity Agreement." The petition
includes McFarlin's affidavit that Linda is "somewhat retarded" and spends
nights with men, and that McFarlin cannot watch her all the time.
The state court petition and order are astonishing documents. 23 Both
were apparently drafted by McFarlin's attorney; they are stapled together
with a blueback bearing his name and address. The order is typed at the
bottom of the second page of the petition. The petition has no case caption
naming parties and the court; the caption is of the sort used for affidavits.
The first two paragraphs of the petition set out the facts summarized above.
The fourth and last is an attestation clause. If the petition has any operative
legal language, it is the third paragraph, which reads as follows:
Said affiant does hereby in consideration of the Court [sic] of the
DeKalb Circuit Court approving the Tubal Ligation being performed upon her minor daughter does hereby [sic] covenant and
agree to indemnify and keep indemnified and hold Dr. John Hines,
Auburn, Indiana, who said affiant is requesting perform said operation and the DeKalb Memorial Hospital, Auburn, Indiana,
whereat said operation will be performed, harmless from and
against all or any matters or causes of action that could or might
arise as a result of the performing of said Tubal Ligation.
21. 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977) rev'd sub. nom. Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978).
22. 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978).
23. The Office of the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, Fort Wayne Division, furnished copies of these documents. The order is set out in the
Seventh Circuit's opinion at 552 F.2d 174 n.I. Both documents are set out in the Supreme
Court's opinion at 98 S. Ct. 1102-03.
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The order states:
I, Harold D. Stump, Judge of the DeKalb Circuit Court, do hereby
approve the above Petition by affidavit form on behalf of Ora
Spitler McFarlin, to have Tubal Ligation performed upon her
minor duaghter, Linda Spitler, subject to said Ora Spitler McFarlin covenanting and agreeing to indemnify and keep indemnified
Dr. John Hines and the DeKalb Memorial Hospital from any
matters or causes of action arising therefrom.
The order does not tell Linda to submit to sterilization, nor does it tell
the doctor or the hospital to perform the sterilization. The order merely
"approve[s] the petition," which does not expressly ask for anything. The
use of consideration language suggests that the petition offers a contract,
which the order accepts, but that is presumably an artifact of the incompetent draftsmanship; no consideration runs to the judge. The order seems
more like a declaratory judgment than anything else, and that is the arguable
intention of the parties. But the indemnity provisions suggest that the parties
had some doubt as to whether the operation was legal even with the court's
approval, which suggests that they did not consider it a declaratory judgment. That, together with the bizarre form of the petition and order, at least
raises the possibility that these two documents had no legal effect whatsoever.
The order and petition bear the same date. Linda was not served; no
guardian ad litem was appointed; no hearing was held; apparently, no
medical evidence was submitted. Linda was told that she was being hospitalized for an appendectomy, and the sterilization was performed. In 1973
she married plaintiff Leo Sparkman, and in 1975 she learned what had
happened to her. The Sparkmans filed a damage action against Linda's
mother, her mother's lawyer, Judge Stump, the hospital, and the three
doctors who participated in the operation. The only issue reached by the
Seventh Circuit was whether Judge Stump is immune from suit.
B.

The Seventh Circuit's Opinion

The court began by citing the two leading cases, Pierson v. Ray 24 and
Bradley v. Fisher,25 for the rule that Judge Stump had absolute immunity
unless he acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction. Next, the court stated that
"jurisdiction" refers to jurisdiction over subject matter, implying that clear
absence ef jurisdiction over persons is irrelevant. Bradley can be read either
to support or refute that conclusion; 26 several courts have indicated in dicta
that personal jurisdiction is required.2 7 Without discussion, the Seventh
24.
25.
26.
27.

386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967).
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871) (alternative holding).
See text accompanying notes 92-102 infra.
Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 1977); Duba v. McIntyre, 501 F.2d 590,
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Circuit resolved that question in a way which precluded easy resolution of
the case. The court could have said that Judge Stump acted in clear absence
of all jurisdiction over Linda, since no effort was made to serve her, and that
therefore he is not immune to any suit by her. The Supreme Court also
resolved this issue without ever seeing that it existed. It simply stated,
without explanation, that subject matter jurisdiction is the test.28 Neither the
majority nor the dissenters even noted that personal jurisdiction was lacking.
The Seventh Circuit sought to demonstrate that Judge Stump acted in
clear absence of subject matter jurisdiction. The relevant statutes give Judge
Stump's court jurisdiction "in all cases at law and in equity whatsoever, and
in criminal cases and actions for divorce, . . . of the settlement of decedents' estates and of guardianships, . . . and . . of all other causes,
matters and proceedings where exclusive jurisdiction thereof is not conferred by law on some other court, board or officer," 29 "in all cases in
which a child is alleged to be delinquent, dependent or neglected [and] to
determine the paternity of any child born out of wedlock, and to provide for
the support and disposition of such child. '30 The court ignored all but the
first phrase of these jurisdictional grants, and said the test was whether
McFarlin's claim presented a case in law or equity.
Having said that, the court substantially ignored McFarlin's claim and
proceeded to analyze whether Judge Stump had authority to order sterilization.31 That is, the court shifted its focus from the claim to the result. This
was an important shift, for it blurred the merits with the jurisdictional issue.
Indeed, the court equated the two. It argued that Judge Stump had no
jurisdiction to order sterilization because there was no statutory authorization and no precedent, and because it was not "a valid exercise of the power
32
•to fashion new common law."
Apparently the court's view was that if the result is sufficiently erroneous-if there is no authority at all for a judge's order-then it is not merely
an erroneous order, but an order entered without jurisdiction. But "jurisdiction" normally refers to the power to decide a case at all, not the power
to decide it in a certain way. 33 "[I]t is well settled that the failure to state a
592 (8th Cir. 1974); Ryan v. Scoggin, 245 F.2d 54, 58, 59 (10th Cir. 1957); Thompson v. Heither,
235 F.2d 176, 177 (6th Cir. 1956); Kenney v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288, 292 (6th Cir. 1956); McGlasker
v. Calton, 397 F. Supp. 525, 529 (M.D. Ala. 1975); Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 337 F. Supp. 671,
673 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
28. 98 S. Ct. at 1104-05.
29. IND. CODE § 33-4-4-3 (1975) (quoted at 552 F.2d at 174 n.2).
30. IND. CODE § 33-12-2-3 (1975); see IND. CODE §§ 33-12-1-1, 33-12-2-1 and accompanying
Compiler's Note, and 33-12-2-2 (1975).
31. 552 F.2d at 174-75.
32. Id. at 175-76.
33. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 538 (1974); The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co.,
228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913).
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proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a
dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Whether the complaint states a cause of
action on which relief could be granted . . . must be decided after and not
34
before the court has assumed jurisdiction over the controversy."
The distinction is more than formal. The purpose of jurisdictional rules
is to allocate the power to decide. If one court dismisses a case for lack of
jurisdiction, the plaintiff remains free to seek relief in other courts, unhampered by res judicata. The dismissal means only that the plaintiff was in the
wrong court; the implication is that some other court can hear the claim.
But that is not at all how the Seventh Circuit used the word jurisdiction
in Sparkman. It did not find that McFarlin was in the wrong court; it found
that no court in Indiana could approve Linda's sterilization. That conclusion
goes to the merits. The only effects of calling it jurisdictional are to reduce
the res judicata effect of refusals to approve sterilizations in Indiana, leaving
plaintiffs free to try again in other states, and, of course, to make Stump
liable. There are other authorities which confuse jurisdiction with the merits
35
in similar ways, but none justify the usage and few have escaped criticism.
In any event, it is unnecessary to decide the meaning of jurisdiction in
the abstract. The Indiana jurisdictional statute is written in conformity with
the usage advocated here. Its grant of jurisdiction over "all . . .causes,
matters and proceedings where exclusive jurisdiction thereof is not conferred by law on some other court, board or officer, 3 6 is clearly intended to
avoid the anomaly posited by the Seventh Circuit-a claim over which no
tribunal has jurisdiction. Nor is there anything in the statute that suggests
there can be jurisdiction to deny a claim without there being jurisdiction to
grant it. The statute confers jurisdiction "in cases . . .and of . . .causes,
matters and proceedings;" 3 7 nothing suggests that jurisdiction depends on
what the court does with the case, cause, matter, or proceeding.
34. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 542 (1974) (quoting with approval from Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)).
35. See, e.g., Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308, 319 (1870) (unexplained dicta
that jurisdiction can refer to power to reach a particular result); Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 337
F. Supp. 671, 673 (S.D. Ohio 1971) (same, in judicial immunity case); McGlasker v. Calton, 397
F. Supp. 525, 529 (M.D. Ala. 1975) (rejecting Wade and limiting Cooper);Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351-52 (1871) (dictum giving examples inconsistent with normal usage, but
stating that immunity would attach in each such example); Kattan, Knocking on Wood: Some
Thoughts on the Immunities of State Officials to Civil Rights Damage Actions, 30 VAND. L.
REV. 941, 959-62 (1977) (supporting much of Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Sparkman)
[hereinafter cited as Kattan]; Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849, 856-58 (9th Cir. 1977) (following Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Sparkman); Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 32 (1933) (no
federal jurisdiction if federal claim obviously foreclosed by prior decision); Hagans v. Lavine,
415 U.S. 528, 538 (1974) (questioning Poresky); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 404 (1970)
(same); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946) (same); 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1970) (NorrisLaGuardia Act, accomplishing substantive ends of Congress in jurisdictional language).
36. IND. CODE § 33-4-4-3 (1975).
37. Id.
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The Seventh Circuit alluded twice to a view of jurisdiction as depending on the nature of the case, but its analysis went to the result. The court
first relied on an Indiana statute which authorized sterilization of institutionalized persons under specified circumstances and procedures,38
concluding that it "clearly negates jurisdiction to consider sterilization in
cases not involving institutionalized persons and in which these procedures
are not followed." ,39 The court did not consider the effect of other sterilization statutes,' or of the statute providing that a parent can consent to
"medical or surgical treatment" of a minor child. 4' Suppose McFarlin had
requested a declaratory judgment that sterilization is "surgical treatment"
within the meaning of this last statute and that so construed, the statute is
constitutional. It would be absurd to say that the statute authorizing sterilization of institutionalized persons "clearly negates jurisdiction" over such a
claim.
A.L. v. G.R.H.4 2 was very similar to that hypothetical case. In A.L., a
mother sought a declaratory judgment that she had the right to have her son3
4
sterilized. The Indiana Appellate Court denied her request on the merits.
Obviously there was jurisdiction; a request for declaratory judgment presents a case at law or in equity. And as noted, Stump's order looks more like
a declaratory judgment than anything else. Judge Stump relied on A.L. to
prove that he could consider sterilization, but the court found that A.L.
undercut his position because the sterilization had been refused." Only by
equating jurisdiction with the merits could the Seventh Circuit draw support
from A.L..
The court also cited four cases from other jurisdictions, each holding
45
that courts may not order sterilization without legislative authorization.
Here the court disregarded its earlier suggestion (offered as an additional
ground for rejecting Judge Stump's reliance on A.L.) that only opinions
before Stump's order were relevant; two of its four cases came after his
1971 decree. It acknowledged In re Simpson, 46 which supports Judge
Stump's action, but found that case "questionable" '4 7 in light of Wade v.
Bethesda Hospital," announced after Stump's decision. The court failed to
38. IND. CODE §§ 16-13-13-1 to 16-13-13-4 (1973) (repealed 1974).
39. 552 F.2d at 175.
40. IND. CODE §§ 16-13-13-6, 16-13-14-1 to 16-13-14-5, 16-13-15-1 to 16-13-15-6 (1973)
(repealed 1974).
41. IND. CODE § 16-8-3-1 (1973).
42. 325 N.E.2d 501 (Ind. App. 1975).
43. Id. at 502.
44. 552 F.2d at 175.
45. Kemp v. Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974); In re M.K.R., 515
S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974); Frazier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); Holmes v.
Powers, 439 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1968).
46. 180 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio Prob. 1962).
47. 552 F.2d at 175 n.5.
48. 356 F. Supp. 380, 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1973, 1971).
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note that In re Simpson relied on an otherwise unreported Maryland case,
Ex parte Eaton.49 Moreover, in both of the pre-1971 cases relied on by the
Seventh Circuit, 50 the state courts exercised jurisdiction over the sterilization request but denied it on the merits.
Finally, the court said that Judge Stump's order was not "a valid
exercise of the power

.

.

.

to fashion new common law."'" That can only

mean that Stump's order was erroneous, for anything he did would have
made new law. McFarlin's claim presented a case of first impression in
Indiana; to approve sterilization, to disapprove, or even to find that he
lacked jurisdiction, would make new law. The Seventh Circuit understandably disagreed with the law he made. But the issue is whether Judge Stump
would have jurisdiction to consider the question if properly presented, and
the answer is clearly yes. No other tribunal would have jurisdiction. Judge
Stump's job would be to decide the question one way or the other on the
merits, not to dismiss for want of jurisdiction and leave it forever in limbo,
presenting an unresolved legal issue which no court could decide.
Of course, it is arguable that McFarlin's bizarre petition presented
nothing to decide. A document with no named parties and no prayer for
relief may be so unlike any normal pleading that it does not present a
"case," or even a "matter," within the jurisdictional statute. The Seventh
Circuit might plausibly have disposed of the case on that ground. That
would have been much more defensible than the actual holding that Judge
Stump had no jurisdiction to consider sterilization even if the issue were
properly presented.
In reversing, the Supreme Court relied squarely on the distinction
which the Seventh Circuit blurred; it held that Judge Stump had jurisdiction
to consider McFarlin's petition even if he should have rejected it on the
merits. 52
C.

The TraditionalPolicies

Arguably, the foregoing analysis puts too much emphasis on the word
"jurisdiction." Perhaps the best thing that can be said for the Seventh
Circuit's opinion is that it really suggests a new test, and its only mistake is
to try to make the new test fit under the old label. This new test would be
that a judge is not immune when he clearly exceeds his powers, without
regard to whether his error is jurisdictional, substantive, or procedural.
There is much to be said in favor of such a test. But such a test would be
hard to reconcile with the traditionally stated reasons for judicial immunity.
49.
50.
579 (Ky.
51.
52.

180 N.E.2d at 208.
Frazier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d
1968).
552 F.2d at 175-76.
98 S. Ct. 1105-06.
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One such reason is that judges are required to decide all cases within
their jurisdiction, including difficult cases, cases with high stakes, and cases
with intense feeling on both sides.53 It would be unfair to require a judge to
decide and then hold him liable in damages when he errs, or more precisely,
when a second judge disagrees with him. 54 Moreover, the public interest
requires that a judge be free to exercise his own judgment, independently
and without fear of liability. 55 The Supreme Court has given so much weight
to these factors that the immunity extends beyond good faith errors and
protects corrupt or malicious decisions. 56 Similarly, there is no liability for
errors on the merits, even when the issue is "settled beyond question" by
earlier decisions of the United States Supreme Court.57
Whether the reasons offered for this absolute immunity actually justify
it is a difficult separate issue. Except for prosecutors, 58 officials of the
executive branch have only qualified immunity. They are liable for their
malicious acts,5 9 and also for any act which they "knew or reasonably
should have known . .

.

would violate constitutional rights."'

Such offi-

cials as school board members, state hospital superintendents, 62 prison
administrators, 63 and policemen 64 are held responsible for knowing "set66
tled, indisputable law" 65 and "basic, unquestioned constitutional rights."
It is hard to understand why judges and prosecutors are not required to know
at least as much law as policemen. But that question must be put aside for
lack of space; this analysis will accept the Supreme Court's basic policy
67
judgments concerning judicial immunity.
The Seventh Circuit's opinion does not serve the announced policies. It
61

53.

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335,

347-49 (1871).

54. Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282, 297 (N.Y. Sup. 1810); Jennings, Tort Liability of
Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263, 272 (1937).

55. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335,
347-49 (1871); Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 536 (1868).
56. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347-49 (1871) (alternative holding).
57. Compare Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967); with Bailey v. Patterson, 369
U.S. 31, 33 (1962) and cases cited therein.
58. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
59. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975).
60. Id. at 322.
61.

Id.

62. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576-77 (1975).
63. Procunier v. Navarette, 98 S. Ct. 855 (1978); Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. March 20, 1978) (No. 77-121); Knell v. Bensinger,
522 F.2d 720, 724-25 (7th Cir. 1975).
64. Foster v. Zeeko, 540 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1976).
65. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975).
66. Id. at 322.
67. For criticism of those judgments, see Kates, Immunity of State Judges Under the
FederalCivil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U. L. REV. 615 (1970); Note,
Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322 (1969).

CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

is impossible in principle to distinguish a judicial act in excess of authority
from an ordinary judicial error. Every judge must determine in the first
instance the extent of his own authority, and he may err in doing so. The
Seventh Circuit's opinion suggests that requiring "clear" or "substantial"
excess of authority is not enough to protect all good faith errors. At the time
Judge Stump acted, there were available to him two decisions from other
states consistent with his action and two inconsistent with it. 68 In addition,
there were statutes giving him power to order sterilization under at least
some circumstances, and a statute authorizing parents to consent to surgical
treatment of their children. If after full briefing by real adversaries Judge
Stump had given the matter careful consideration and decided to follow the
two decisions ordering sterilization, it would be hard to say he so clearly
exceeded his authority that he should be held liable in damages for his error.
Yet that is the basis of the Seventh Circuit's opinion.
Of course, Judge Stump did not carefully consider the issue. What
makes his alleged conduct so reprehensible is not that he was wrong on the
merits, but that he ignored any semblance of due process. Linda was not
notified. No guardian ad litem was appointed. No one had a chance to argue
that sterilization was beyond Judge Stump's power, or that Linda was not
retarded, or that she should not be sterilized even if she were. Finally, Judge
Stump did not notify Linda of his order. His failure to require that Linda be
notified at any stage of the proceedings made it possible for the other
defendants to carry out the sterilization without telling her what was happening.
Most importantly, Judge Stump's procedural omissions made it impossible for Linda to appeal. This is directly related to the other component of
the justification for judicial immunity. Absolute judicial immunity is tolerable only because there is usually a way to correct a judge's errors without
suing him. The remedy, of course, is to defend vigorously, make one's
record, and appeal. 69 Having made it impossible for Linda to pursue the
normal remedy, Judge Stump is responsible for the fact that compensatory
damages are the only remedy still available, and he should be liable for
those damages.
In a paragraph near the end of the opinion, the Seventh Circuit relied on
Judge Stump's "failure to comply with elementary principles of procedural
due process,"' but only as an alternate ground for finding lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. The court said that "[tihis kind of purported justice does
68. See text accompanying notes 45-50 supra.
69. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,554 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 353
(1871).
70. 552 F.2d at 176.
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not fall within the categories of cases at law or in equity . . . and was
71
therefore taken without jurisdiction."
Obviously the Seventh Circuit felt locked into the Supreme Court's
formulation of the judicial immunity rule as depending on jurisdiction. But
the Court has never squarely addressed the question whether jurisdiction is
the proper test, and it could reformulate the standard without overruling any
of its earlier decisions. Sparkman provided an opportunity for the Court to
do so, but it refused the chance. 72
The clear absence of jurisdiction test is subject to all the problems of
the clear excess of authority test explored above; as the Court has said,
"some of the most difficult and embarrassing questions which a judicial
officer is called upon to consider and determine relate to his jurisdiction." 73
The policies of preserving judicial independence and not penalizing good
faith errors are as important with respect to jurisdictional questions as they
are with respect to the merits. And it is just as hard to distinguish ordinary
errors on jurisdictional questions from actions taken in clear absence of all
jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has offered only one example of an act outside the
scope of immunity; in Bradley v. Fisher, the Court hypothesized that a
judge with jurisdiction limited to probate matters would not be immune if he
tried a criminal case. 74 The Court has also suggested that it is impossible for
a court of general jurisdiction to act in clear absence of subject matter
jurisdiction, 75 a dictum overlooked by the Seventh Circuit in Sparkman.
Questions of personal jurisdiction are equally difficult. The complete failure
to give notice that the action was pending makes Sparkman an easy case for
finding clear absence of jurisdiction over the person, but there are not many
other examples.
The rule that a judge loses his immunity when he clearly exceeds his
jurisdiction did not arise from any consideration of the policies underlying
the immunity rule. Rather, it was apparently derived from a notion that
when a judge exceeds his jurisdiction, he ceases to act as a judge; "his
commission would afford no protection to him in the exercise of usurped
authority.' '76 Because that idea so completely failed to serve the policies
underlying the immunity, it was immediately modified by introducing the
requirement that the absence of jurisdiction must be clear. 77 But that is no
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
98 S. Ct. 1106.
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 352 (1871).
Id.
Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 536 (1868).
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 352 (1871).
Id. at 351-53.
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substitute for reframing the rule to serve its purpose directly. The dangers of
the present rule are illustrated by Sparkman; the Seventh Circuit surely
would have written a better opinion if it had not felt compelled to frame
everything it said in jurisdictional terms. The opinion it did write could
result in good judges being afraid to make ground-breaking decisions, in bad
judges being held liable for stupid but honest mistakes, and in litigants who
never had a chance to defend or appeal being denied a damage remedy
because the offending judge had subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court's reversal avoided the first two dangers, but it brought the third to
fruition.
D. A Rule Based on the Policies
A rule derived from the policies underlying the immunity would focus
not on jurisdiction, but on whether the judge accorded all parties an adequate opportunity for hearing and appellate review. At a minimum, a judge
should be liable if he proceeds without proof of proper efforts to notify all
parties, or if he proceeds without appointing a guardian ad litem for a minor
or incompetent defendant, or if he imposes irreversible harm on a litigant
before an appeal can be perfected, as in Sparkman and the cases where
judges have physically assaulted litigants. 78 Exceptions from the foregoing
rules would have to be made in cases where judges act or purport to act
pursuant to special procedural rules dispensing with notice, as in temporary
restraining orders, attachments, and similar devices for granting temporary
relief on an ex parte basis, and in class actions and other fiduciary litigation.
Arguably, there should be liability for obviously unjustifiable reliance on a
defaulting fiduciary.
The existence of exceptions means that the standard proposed does not
furnish a bright line test. But the line-drawing problems under this standard
do not have the same effect as the line-drawing problems under the jurisdiction and excess of authority tests. Those tests encourage judicial caution
on substantive, jurisdictional, and procedural issues where the cautious
approach will be right only part of the time; sometimes the bold decision is
correct. Liability for exceeding jurisdiction or authority would introduce an
unacceptable bias into decision-making.
By contrast, it is always wrong for a judge to grant permanent relief
without efforts to notify the other litigants or their representatives. If the risk
of liability causes judges to be more cautious about satisfying themselves
that notice has been given, or insisting on scrupulous compliance with the
rules and statutes governing notice, no harm has been done. Judges should
78. Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974); Lucarell v. McNair, 453 F.2d 836
(6th Cir. 1972) (referee).
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be independent in deciding cases after full opportunity for adversary proceedings, but they should not be free to independently dispense with that
opportunity. A bias in favor of giving all litigants a chance to defend is quite
acceptable.
A rule of liability for judicial action taken without permitting defense
or appeal is directly related to the justifications for immunity. This is best
demonstrated by considering the possible results of an appeal in Sparkman.
A timely state appeal would have made the Seventh Circuit's analysis
impossible. If the sterilization order had been reversed before surgery, the
federal suit would never have been brought. If the Supreme Court of Indiana
had affirmed, the decision would have authoritatively established that Judge
Stump had jurisdiction and had decided the case correctly insofar as state
law controlled. A federal defense could be raised on appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States, or on habeas corpus to the hospital, but the
federal defense could not plausibly be characterized as jurisdictional.
Similarly, if a litigant is given a meaningful chance to defend and
appeal and fails to use it, then he should be held barred by res judicata or
failure to mitigate damages in any subsequent suit against the judge. Suits
under section 198379 may be an exception80 to the federal res judicata
statute; 8 it is disconcerting to think that all opportunity for future exercise
of a federal right could be lost through lack of diligence or through one
erroneous decision by someone like Judge Stump. But however strong the
argument for injunctive relief, damage actions against the judge raise stronger countervailing considerations. Since an appeal would normally protect
him, either by correcting his error and eliminating damage, or by vindicating his judgment and eliminating liability, a judge should be entitled to insist
that the appeal be taken. Thus, he should be liable for the long run effects of
his judgments only when he culpably precludes defense or appeal. And
when he does that, there is no reason to also consider whether he acted
without jurisdiction.
Damages pending appeal, such as time in jail or time subject to an
erroneous injunction, raise different considerations. Those damages would
be irreparable under the test proposed here. A jurisdiction test could occasionally remedy such damages, but the cases reached by such a test would
not necessarily be the grossest examples; the real problem is not lack of
jurisdiction. A rule tailored to the problem would impose liability for orders
in violation of clearly settled rights. That would require the overruling of
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
80. Laycock, Federal Interference With State Prosecutions: The Need For Prospective
Relief, 1977 S. CT. REV. 193, 231-35 [hereinafter cited as Laycock]; but see Currie, Res
Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. Cm. L. REV. 317, 327-32 (1978).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970).
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Pierson v. Ray, 82 and consideration of the possibility raises basic policy
83
questions beyond the scope of this discussion.
Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent in the Supreme Court relied on the
impossibility of appeal as one factor supporting his conclusion that Judge
Stump's signing of the petition had not been a judicial act, 8 4 a conclusion
rejected by the majority.8 5 Justice Powell's dissent took a position quite
similar to the one urged here. He argued that judicial immunity presupposed
the possibility of relief elsewhere in the judicial system, and that Judge
Stump had forfeited his immunity by precluding such relief. 86 The majority
did not even acknowledge his argument.
E.

The Supreme Court Precedents

The rule proposed here is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
prior holdings. Pierson v. Ray 8 7 and Randall v. Brigham88 present little
problem. In each, the defendant judge clearly had jurisdiction of both person
and subject matter, heard both sides, and decided in due course.8 9 The
proceedings in Randall were informally commenced, but the judge gave full
opportunity to defend. There are references in both cases to jurisdiction as
the test of immunity, 90 and in Randall to malice and corruption as the test, 91
but careful definition of the limits of immunity was not required in either
case. Randall turned on whether judicial immunity should be recognized at
all, and Pierson on whether the doctrine was repealed by section 1983.
Bradley v. Fisher92 is more difficult. Bradley was an attorney who
allegedly insulted Judge Fisher during a trial and threatened to assault him;
Bradley denied those allegations. At the conclusion of the trial, without
notice, Fisher disbarred Bradley from his court.
Bradley sued, alleging that he had been disbarred from the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia. Fisher answered that the disbarment order
extended only to the Criminal Court of the District of Columbia, which was
a division of the Supreme Court. The Court first decided the case on this
side issue, holding that Bradley was not disbarred from the Supreme Court
of the District and therefore had not proved his complaint.93 Only then did
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

386 U.S. 547 (1967); see note 57 supra.
See text accompanying notes 58-67 supra.
98 S. Ct. at I I11.(Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1106-08.
Id. at 1111-12 (Powell, J., dissenting).
386 U.S. 547 (1967).
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868).
386 U.S. at 553; 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 539-40.
386 U.S. at 554; 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 535-37.
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 535-37.
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
Id.
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the Court take up the immunity issue as an alternative ground for decision.
The Court found it well settled that Fisher was immune if he had
jurisdiction. Several times the Court referred to jurisdiction over the subject
matter, and once to "jurisdiction of both subject and person." ,94 Some of the
Court's examples of exceeding jurisdiction seem to be examples of errors on
the merits which result in the judge exceeding his powers, but the Court said
no liability would attach in those examples because they involved mere
excess of jurisdiction, not clear absence of jurisdiction. 95 The Court had no
difficulty in concluding that every court had jurisdiction over the attorneys
admitted to practice before it and had the power to disbar them.' The Court
then said that it was error to disbar Bradley without citing him to show cause
why disbarment should not be entered. However, the Court continued:
But this erroneous manner in which its jurisdiction was exercised,
however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not make
the act any less a judicial act; nor did it render the defendant liable
to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though
the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever
over its attorneys.'
Bradley simply accepted earlier cases holding that clear absence of
jurisdiction is the test for loss of immunity, without examining whether that
should be the rule, or even carefully considering and defining what is meant
by "jurisdiction". Certainly it does not furnish any general solution to
judicial immunity questions. But its alternative holding that Fisher did not
lose his immunity by failing to notify Bradley that disbarment was being
considered is obviously relevant to Sparkman v. McFarlin. Indeed, the
Supreme Court in Sparkman relied on the passage just quoted to support the
proposition that even "grave procedural errors" do not affect immunity so
long as there is jurisdiction. The easy answer is to say that that part of
Bradley is old, only an alternative holding, and wrong, and that the Court
should have disregarded it. But the Court was not required to go that far.
Sparkman and Bradley are distinguishable in at least two important ways.
First, Bradley's references to jurisdiction over attorneys are ambiguous; they may refer to jurisdiction over the subject matter of attorney
discipline, or to jurisdiction over the persons of attorneys, or both. Bradley
can be read as suggesting that all attorneys submit to the continuing personal
jurisdiction of each court that admits them to practice, or that Bradley
submitted to the jurisdiction of Judge Fisher's court when he appeared
before it for the trial out of which the alleged contempt arose. Under either
of these views, notice that disbarment was being considered would not be
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

352.
351-52.
356.
357.
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necessary to obtain jurisdiction, but only to assure procedural fairness. 98
This reading would reconcile the paragraph quoted above with the earlier
dictum that jurisdiction of both person and subject matter is required, and
with a holding in Sparkman that Judge Stump is not immune because he
never acquired jurisdiction over Linda's person. The Supreme Court never
considered this possibility, because it never considered the lack of personal
jurisdiction.
Second, the degree of procedural abuse in Bradley was much less than
in Sparkman. Bradley was notified of the disbarment order, and unlike
sterilization, it was not irreversible. Bradley was free to ask Judge Fisher to
reconsider and to offer whatever denial, explanation, apology, or other
defense he had. If disbarment orders had then been appealable, Bradley
could have appealed. Appeal was not permitted, and review by mandamus
was limited, 99 but those limitationswere not imposed by Fisher. The Court
refused to decide in Bradley whether the disbarment was valid, or whether
the attorney had some other remedy available to him in which he could deny
the whole incident; 1" it concluded only that suing the judge was not the
remedy. Thus, the result in Bradley is not inconsistent with deciding
Sparkman on the ground that Stump lost his immunity by making it
impossible for Linda to either defend or appeal.
Affirming Sparkman on that ground would have gone far toward
rationalizing the law of judicial immunity. It would have accounted for all
the Court's decisions and reconciled the rule with the reasons given for the
rule. But if the Supreme Court also felt bound by the traditional emphasis on
jurisdiction, then it should have made clear that "jurisdiction" includes
jurisdiction over the person. That would have led to affirmance in
Sparkman and would reach many of the cases covered by the rule proposed
here.
The Supreme Court did none of these things. It did not even think about
them, despite Justice Powell's urgings. It simply applied its modified
version of the traditional formulation in the broadest possible way. The
result is an immunity with no meaningful limits-perhaps no limits at all for
judges of courts of general jurisdiction. The result would apparently have
been no different if Judge Stump had ordered Linda executed rather than
sterilized; the Court went out of its way to say that "tragic consequences"
were irrelevant except to the extent that their "controversial" nature in0
creased the need for immunity.' 1
98. Cf. Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308,319 (1870) (levy of writ of attachment
gives jurisdiction over property; failure to publish notice is error, but does not affect jurisdiction).
99. Ex parte Bradley, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 364, 376-77 (1868).
100. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 356-57 (1871).
101. 98 S. Ct. at 1108.
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Such conclusions follow from making immunity depend solely on
subject matter jurisdiction. Sparkman squarely adopts the subject matter
jurisdiction test, and it is hard to see how any future court could distinguish
it away. But the test is adopted by assertion in a single sentence; the Court
has still never attempted to explain why subject matter jurisdiction should be
the test. One can at least hope that some future Court will consider itself free
to take "the first opportunity . . . to fully explore and treat . . . in a
written opinion" 102 the relevance of personal jurisdiction to judicial immunity, and perhaps even the rest of the issues disposed of sub silentio in
Sparkman.
II.
MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY-MDONALD

V. ILLINOIS

A. The Issue
1
A second important immunity decision is McDonald v. Illinois . 03
McDonald was convicted of murder and served two years in prison before
being given a pardon based on innocence. He then filed suit against a large
number of defendants. The district court entered dismissals or summary
judgments for defendants on every claim. Most of these results were affirmed for failure to state a claim or in routine applications of various immunities.
Only one of McDonald's claims was reinstated. He alleged that defendant Weil, former Superintendent of the Cook County Department of Corrections, had refused to allow McDonald's attorney to photograph him shortly
after his arrest. The photograph would allegedly have tended to corroborate
McDonald's somewhat improbable trial testimony that he had been robbed
and beaten near the scene of the murder. This claim of interference with the
right to counsel was remanded for trial of the merits and of any immunity
defense.
The important issue was posed by McDonald's claim against Cook
County based on Weil's alleged misconduct; this claim was dismissed.
Some background is necessary to an understanding of the claim against the
county. McDonald's claim against Weil was brought under section 1983,
which gives a cause of action against "any person" who, under color of
state law, deprives another of a federal right. In 1961, the Supreme Court
held that municipalities cannot be sued under this statute because they are
not persons within its meaning. 104 The decision went much further than the
102. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974).
103. 557 F.2d 596 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 508 (1977).
104. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961); accord, City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412
U.S. 507, 511-14 (1973).
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legislative history on which it relied, 105 but the result is settled and has been
extended to include counties. 1° Accordingly, the claim against Cook
County was not based on section 1983.
Instead, McDonald sued Cook County directly under the fourteenth
amendment, asserting an implied cause of action rather than one created by
statute. Implied causes of action for constitutional violations were authorized by the Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal
0 7 a case involving
Bureau of Narcotics,"
federal agents and the fourth
amendment. The Seventh Circuit applied Bivens to a fourteenth amendment
claim against a unit of local government in Hostrop v. Board of Junior
College DistrictNo. 515,108 where a college president was unconstitutionally discharged by the college board. There is some dispute whether Bivens
should be extended to suits against local government, but Hostrop is in
accord with the majority view on that issue, 1°9 and it will be treated as
settled in this discussion.
Despite Bivens and Hostrop, Judge Fairchild's opinion for the Seventh
Circuit approved dismissal of the claim against Cook County. Hostrop was
distinguished on the ground that there, the unconstitutional act was committed by the governing board of the district, whereas McDonald sought to
impose vicarious liability.'-1 0 The reasons given for this distinction were
superficial; the major premises on which they rest were not stated. To
analyze the opinion fairly, its hidden premises must first be identified.
The basic premise of this discussion is that a county's corporate
105. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 517-20 (1973) (Appendix to Douglas, J.
dissenting); Hundt, Suing Municipalities Directly Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 Nw. U.
L. REV. 770, 785-86 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hundt]; Note, Developing Governmental
Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1201, 1203-07 (1971).
106. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 698-710 (1973).
107. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
108. 523 F.2d 569, 577 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976); see also Fitzgerald
v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 718-19 n.7 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 916
(1976); Calvin v. Conlisk, 520 F.2d 1, 8-10 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 424 U.S.
902, plaintiff's cross petition for cert. denied sub nom. Afro-American Patrolmen's League v.
Conlisk, 424 U.S. 912 (1976).
109. See Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 1977) (collecting cases from the
Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits); Owen v. City of Independence, 560
F.2d 925, 933 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3438 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1977) (No. 77-914)
(collecting district court cases); Kattan, supra note 35, at 996-97 and n.286 (collecting cases
from the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits); Note, Damage Remedies Against
Municipalities For Constitutional Violations, 89 HARV. L. REV. 922, 927-29 (1976) (collecting
cases) [hereinafter cited as Damage Remedies]; but see Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018,
1022-26, cert. filed sub nom. City of Pittsburgh v. Mahone, 46 U.S.L.W. 3374 (U.S. Oct. 11,
1977) (No. 77-731) (no need to imply fourteenth amendment cause of action when city is liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970)); id. at 1052-61 (Garth, J., concurring) (finding no implied cause
of action under fourteenth amendment) (collecting cases and commentary, and attempting to
distinguish cases implying remedy); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 41-45 (1st Cir. 1977) (refusing
to imply remedy for tort of employee).
110. 557 F.2d 596, 604.
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existence must be treated as real. A county is not the same as its citizens, its
officers, or its employees. Relationships between a county and its employees and officers should be analyzed in terms of agency law. Relationships
between a county and its citizens should not be analyzed that way; those
relationships depend on organic and constitutional law, and to consider the
county as a common law agent of the citizenry can only create confusion.
Whenever a county claims immunity from normal liability rules, it bears the
burden of demonstrating that the public interest requires immunity.
McDonald does not make a case for immunity from vicarious liability.
Indeed, the court's vicarious liability argument did not succeed in
distinguishing Hostrop. Organizational liability is always vicarious, for the
organization can only act through individuals authorized to act for it. In
Hostrop, individual board members voted to fire the plaintiff. Those individuals did not pay any judgment; they were held personally immune.'1
The district's liability for their act was vicarious. The McDonald opinion
initially viewed Hostrop exactly that way. It said that Hostrop was different
because "the responsibility of the entity arose directly out of the action of its
governing board,"'" 12 thus clearly viewing the entity as vicariously liable
for the acts of its board.
For purposes of determining liability, board members should be treated
as the district's highest ranking agents. They are so treated under Illinois
3 The Restatement of Agency
law. 11
draws a slight distinction in the analagous case of corporate directors, but the distinction is not relevant to vicari4
ous liability. 1
B.

The County and Its Citizens
However one characterizes board members, the primary question is
whether there is a relevant factual difference between them and other county
employees. Perhaps the court's major premise was that the less authority or
responsibility a representative has, the more hesitant courts should be to
hold a county responsible for his conduct. There is some intuitive appeal to
the suggestion that it is fairer to hold taxpayers liable for the torts of an
elected board than for the torts of a jailguard; the chain of responsibility may
seem shorter and clearer. A politically appointed department superintendent
such as Weil is more like the board than like a jailguard, but that raises only
a line-drawing objection if a distinction between low and high ranking
agents is accepted in principle.
1i1. Id. ; 523 F.2d 569, 577-78.
112. 557 F.2d at 604 (emphasis added).
113. Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act § 1-202, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 1-202 (1975).
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14C and accompanying Comment a (1958).
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However, such a distinction does not survive careful analysis. Much of
the surface attractiveness of the distinction depends on disaggregating the
entity to focus on taxpayers, and on equating taxpayers with voters. Both
steps are misleading. Many taxpayers are ineligible to vote; corporations
and non-resident property owners are the most notable examples. Thus, the
group entitled to elect the board is not the same as the group required to
finance the board's activities. Taxpayer control cannot be the rationale for
entity liability.
Disaggregation would prove too much even if all taxpayers were
voters. Except for the limited scope of mandamus, no individual voter has
any right to control elected officials, and few have any significant power to
persuade. Nearly half generally voted against each set of incumbents, and
issues which attract the attention of lobbyists and letterwriters generally
produce substantial division of opinion. If liability is to be disaggregated,
then opponents of the incumbent board may plausibly claim exemption from
their share, an obviously unworkable result. Even as a group, voters have no
right to supervise government activities directly, and ballot box control is
better suited to suggesting the general direction of policy than to preventing
torts. 115

This lack of control undercuts the rule in McDonald. If a taxpayer's
power to prevent torts by the board is negligible, it does not matter that he
has even less power to prevent torts by the superintendent or by the guard.
Since the taxpayer's power is negligible in each case, no viable distinction
can be drawn. His share of the entity's liability is not based on his power to
prevent the tort, but on his role in financing the entity. Efforts to assure
fairness to him must focus on the political and fiscal structure of the entity,
not on the liability rules.
Taxpayers' inability to prevent governmental torts might support an
argument that they should not be liable for anything done at any level of
government. But that highlights the fundamental error of looking behind the
entity in the first place. Disaggregating the entity is inconsistent with the
basic notion that all citizens are bound by government action without regard
to individual views or responsibility. 116 Requiring citizens to pay for torts
they oppose is no different from requiring them to obey laws they oppose,
115. See generally A. CLAUSEN, How CONGRESSMEN DECIDE: A POLICY Focus 126-50
(1973); M. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964); W. MILLER & D. STOKES
Constituency Influence in Congress, in ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICAL ORDER 351 (A. Campbell,

P. Converse, W. Miller & D. Stokes eds. 1966); W. MILLER & D. STOKES, Party Government
and the Saliency of Congress, in id. 194; Kuklinski & Elling, Representational Role, Constituency Opinion, and Legislative Roll-Call Behavior, 21 AM. J. POL. SCI. 135 (1977).
116. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495, 521-23 (1937); A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 13-14 (1965).
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fight in wars they oppose, or most analagously, pay for government services
they cannot use and oppose for those who can.
C.

The County and Its Employees

Analysis of government liability rules must proceed, at least initially,
without regard to taxpayers and must focus on the entity itself. The law has
long recognized that a county has a separate existence from the people who
create or inhabit it.117 Indeed, one of the first effects of incorporating local
governments was to make liability possible-to create an entity which could
be sued.)' 8
If the entity and its activities are analyzed in terms of the policies of the
respondeat superior doctrine, it is very difficult to distinguish high ranking
officials from low ranking officials. Three related considerations underlie
respondeat superior;1 19 each depends to some extent on-the view that torts
committed by servants in the course and scope of their employment are a
cost of the master's business and should be internalized. The first consideration is that since servants carry out the master's business and he is
entitled to the fruits of their labors, fairness requires that he also be
responsible for the harm they cause in his behalf. The second is that since
the master has the right to control his servants, efficiency requires that he be
given an incentive to exercise that control in a way which will minimize the
harm his servants cause. The third is that servants are likely to be insolvent,
leaving innocent plaintiffs to bear the loss alone unless the master is liable.
The first two reasons are built into the common law definition of master, so
that respondeat superior never applies if they are not present. 120 The third is
reflected in the plaintiff's option to sue the servant1 2 ' and in the master's
right to indemnity. 122 The effect of the doctrine is to shift the risk of servant
insolvency from plaintiff to master.
McDonald raises the question whether any of these reasons for respondeat superior liability apply more strongly to the county board than to the
superintendent of corrections, or to lower-level employees generally. With
respect to the first reason, the answer is easy. All the county's servants were
hired to carry out its activities; it is as much entitled to benefit from the
117. I E. MCQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 2.07b at n.4 (3d ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as MCQUILLANI.

118. M'Kinnon v. Penson, 155 Eng. Rep. 1369, 1372-73 (Ex. 1853), aff'd, 156 Eng. Rep.
260, 262 (Ex. Ch. 1854); compare Mayor of Lyme Regis v. Henley, 110 Eng. Rep. 29 (K.B.
1832), with Russell v. The Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 362 (K.B. 1788).
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 and accompanying Comment a (1958); W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 68 at 471 (3d ed. 1964).
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(l) (1958).

121.

Id. § 343.

122.

Id. § 401 and accompanying Comment d.
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jailguard's labors as from the county board's. That consideration provides
no distinction.
The third reason is also easy to analyze. An empirical question is
raised, but it seems nearly certain that lower ranking servants are more
likely to be rendered insolvent by a tort judgment than are higher ranking
servants. Thus, the need to apply respondeat superior for deep pocket
purposes is probably greater when low-level servants commit the tort;
certainly this reason does not support McDonald.
The second reason for respondeat superior is more difficult to analyze,
but does not change the conclusion. The point of the second reason is
supervision. The need for supervision extends through the entire chain of
command; indeed, it is plausible to argue that the need for supervision is
greater at the lower levels.
But before this straightforward conclusion can be reached, it is necessary to sort out some problems at the top. It is obviously fictional, and
arguably circular, to think of a county or any other corporation being
encouraged to supervise its servants, when everything it does must be done
through representatives, most of whom are servants. Financial incentives
directed to a county must have their effect on persons with a financial stake
in the county and on persons with fiduciary duties to the county. Of these,
the most important are high-ranking servants-fiduciaries in positions of
control. 123 Respondeat superior encourages the county board and other high
officials to see that the entire chain of supervision works to prevent torts.
The board itself is unsupervised, but if its members' personal immunities are
broader than the county's immunities, then respondeat superior liability will
add to their incentive not to commit torts themselves-assuming (as one
must) that they take their fiduciary responsibilities seriously.
Thus, there is little reason to distinguish the board from the guard for
liability purposes, and what distinction there is cuts against McDonald's
refusal to find liability rather than in favor of it. The law has not drawn any
124
distinction; masters are responsible for the acts of all their servants.
"Thus, . . . managers of great corporations are normally superior servants,
differing only in the dignity and importance of their positions from those
working under them. The rules for determining the liability of the employer
for the conduct of both superior servants and the humblest employees are the
same." 125 Municipal corporations have not been a special case; courts have
normally assumed that liability for torts of ordinary employees followed
26
automatically once municipal immunity objections were eliminated.
123. 557 F.2d 604.
124.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).

125.
126.

Id. § 220 and accompanying Comment a.
See, e.g., Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552, 565 (1900); Holytz v. City of
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D. The Seventh Circuit's Opinion
The Seventh Circuit's assessment of the need for vicarious liability
mentioned only one of the three reasons underlying the normal rule-the
need to give municipalities an incentive to supervise agents in a way which
will minimize constitutional violations. But the court's conclusion that
vicarious municipal liability must be justified as a "judicially imposed
prophylactic" analagous to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule 127 does
not follow. The exclusionary rule deters one wrong by inflicting another and
does not give any rational measure of compensation. By contrast, municipal
liability places losses on the entity in whose behalf they were incurred, and
it is essential to compensation of innocent victims. It is unlikely that Weil
will be able to pay a judgment which compensates McDonald for two years
in prison, or that individual policemen or guards can pay for a beating.
In addition, individual defendants are protected by a set of personal
immunities. 128 These immunities are not derivatively available to masters, 129 and their rationales do not support independent immunity for municipalities. 3 Without municipal liability for the acts of municipal employees,
there will be no viable remedy of any kind for the many types of constitutional violations that cannot be raised in defense of a criminal proceeding or
effectively regulated by injunctions. By noting only one of the three policies
underlying respondeat superior, the court considerably understated the case
for it.
The court did offer some reasons for not applying respondeat superior.
First the court said that the doctrine had not been applied under section
1983. That was factually incorrect, 3 1 but more importantly, it was irrelevant. McDonald's claim was not brought under section 1983, and as the court
Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618, 625 (1962); Moliter v. Kaneland Community Unit
School Dist. No. 302, 18 I11. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960);
Williams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155, 160-61 (N.D. I11. 1975); see generally 17 MCQUILLAN,
supra note 117, at § 49.02; but see Hopkins v. Clemson Ag. College, 221 U.S. 636, 646-47 (1910)
(dictum).
127. 557 F.2d at 604.
128. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislators); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967) (judges); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutors); Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308 (1975) (other officials and employees of the executive branch); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232 (1974) (same); see generally Kattan, supra note 35.
129.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217(b)(ii) (1958); Hostrop v. Board of Junior

College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 576-78 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976)
(sub silentio holding); but cf. Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act § 2-109, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-109 (1975) (exempting municipalities from normal
rule for state law purposes).
130. See Damage Remedies, supra note 109, at 926-27, 955-58; Hundt, supra note 105, at
781-82.

131. See Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 365-70 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds
sub. nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973); Hill v. Toll, 320 F. Supp. 185,
188-89 (E.D. Pa. 1970).

CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

noted, there have been few opportunities to apply respondeat superior under
section 1983 because of the rule that municipalities are not persons who can
be liable under it. 132 There are cases deciding whether supervisors should be
held liable for the acts of subordinates, and some judges have made the
mistake of discussing those cases in terms of respondeat superior. 133 But that
is simply wrong; the doctrine makes masters liable, not higher ranking
fellow servants, 3 4 because only the master is entitled to benefit from the
servant's labor. The supervisor cases have created some confusion, 135 but
they do not support McDonald.
The court also said that respondeat superior liability "would be out of
harmony with the doctrine built up under § 1983, a drastic extension of the
decided cases, and we are not persuaded of the existence of a sufficient
need." 1' 36 This passage suggests that the court's major premise may have
been quite simple: that it had historically been hard to sue governmental
units for constitutional torts, and McDonald had to show why his claim
should be different. But the historical difficulties had nothing to do with
respondeat superior; they derived from the technical definition of "person"
under section 1983. That barrier to recovery was surmounted in Bivens and
Hostrop. If the precedents were drastically extended, it occurred there. The
question in McDonald was not, "Can the county be a defendant?", a
question to which the court's section 1983 analogy might have been relevant. Rather, the question was, "What rules apply to entities that can be
defendants?" 13 7 Thus, there was nothing new in McDonald's claim. Rather,
the court shied away from a combination of settled elements. Causes of
action for constitutional violations are settled law; respondeat superior is
settled law; in the Seventh Circuit, municipal liability is settled law.
It follows that McDonald should not have had to show any need for
liability; the burden of persuasion should have been on the county to show
its right to exemption from the pre-existing rules. That would place the
normal arguments for general governmental immunity in their logical position. If the differences between public and private fiscal structures or the
132. 557 F.2d at 604.
133. See, e.g., Meredith v. Arizona, 523 F.2d 481,484 (9th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Glick, 481
F.2d 1028, 1033-34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Employee-Officer John v. Johnson, 414
U.S. 1033 (1973); Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971); Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d
921, 924 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971); Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183,
199-200 (5th Cir. 1971), modified on rehearing en banc, 456 F.2d 835, cert. denied sub nom.
Nosser v. Bradley, 409 U.S. 848 (1972); Dunham v. Crosby, 435 F.2d 1177, 1179-80 (Ist Cir.
1970).
134. Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271, 1274-75 (8th Cir. 1973); Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d
358, 367 n.24, 370 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. District of Columbia
v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 2(), 358(0) and accompanying Comment a (1958); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1475-76 (4th ed. Rev. 1968).

135. See Draeger v. Grand Central, Inc., 504 F.2d 142, 145-46 (10th Cir. 1974).
136. 557 F.2d at 604.

137. See Hundt, supra note 105,,at 780-81.
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need to protect the policy making process justify governmental immunity, it
is not because such considerations negate the reasons for liability, but
because they outweigh them. The county's argument must sound in confession and avoidance. It is only at this stage that concern for taxpayers
becomes relevant to liability rules. Evaluation of these more general arguments is beyond the scope of this article. It is sufficient to note that they
were not the rationale for McDonald, and probably could not have been in
light of Illinois' failure to accord its counties general immunity from vicarious liability even under state law. 138 Immunity from a federal cause of
action is determined by federal law, 139 but federal courts should not be
impressed by a claim that counties need immunity broader than that accord140
ed by the state that created them.
McDonald did suggest that Hostrop might be extended to hold municipalities liable for such acts of their employees as are "required by a policy
adopted by the governing board." 1 4 1 This suggestion should at least result in
liability for enforcement of unconstitutional ordinances. 14 2 That would fill a
very important remedial gap, for at present injunctions against enforcement
have noare hard to obtain, 14 3 and without damage liability municipalities
1
incentive to honor declaratory judgments of unconstitutionality. 44
But the suggestion is puzzling. Unlike most immunity rules, it would
put a greater risk of liability on policy making than on routine administration. And it would have undesirable consequences. It would give municipalities an incentive to refrain from policy making and to let individual
employees decide for themselves whether and how to honor constitutional
rights. That would be exactly contrary to the law's normal incentive,
implemented by the respondeat superior doctrine: masters are liable if they
control or have the right to control the conduct of their servants. 145 Municipalities should not be encouraged to abdicate their right to control employees on constitutional issues. The court should reconsider the vicarious
liability issue en banc as soon as it arises in another case.
138. See Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, ILL. REV.
ch. 85, §§ 1-101- 10-101 (1975).
139. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 314 (1975); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
553-57 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951); Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 523 (1868); Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 17 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
140. Cf. Miller-Davis Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 567 F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir.
1977) (weight given to state court decision that defendant agency was not the state for sovereign
immunity purposes).
141. 557 F.2d at 604.
142. See Kattan, supra note 35, at 999.
143. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971);
Laycock, supra note 80.
144. See generally Laycock, supra note 80, at 200-02.
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) and accompanying Comment d (1958).
STAT.

CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

III.
REGULATION OF CHURCH LABOR RELATIONS-

CATHOLIC BISHOP V.
v. NLRB 4 6 presented

NLRB

an enormously difficult quesCatholic Bishop
tion: whether the first amendment exempts religious schools from any duty
to bargain collectively with teacher's unions. This issue arose in 1974, when
the National Labor Relations Board first asserted jurisdiction over religious
schools. 147 Since then, the Board and various Roman Catholic bishops have
been in constant litigation.141 The. Seventh Circuit was the first appellate
court to decide the constitutional issue.
Catholic Bishop involved two unions of lay teachers at Roman Catholic schools in two dioceses. Each union won a Board-conducted certification
election; each bishop refused to bargain; each union filed unfair labor
practice charges. The Board found each bishop in violation of the National
Labor Relations Act 149 and ordered him to bargain, to cease interfering with
employees' rights under the Act, and to post the usual notices explaining
those rights and promising not to violate them.' 50 The Seventh Circuit set
aside the Board's orders on the ground that they violated the religion clauses
of the first amendment.15
The result seems correct, at least under current Supreme Court authority, and it was reached for basically the right reasons. But much of the
146. 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1231 (1978).
147. Henry M. Hald High School Ass'n, 213 N.L.R.B. 415, 415 n.2 (1973) [hereinafter the
National Labor Relations Board will be referred to in the text as the Board].
148. See, e.g., Grutka v; Barbour, 549 F.2d 5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 908 (1977);
Caulfield v. Hirsch, 46 U.S.L.W. 2025 (E.D. Pa. July 7, 1977), appealspending, (3d Cir. Nos.
77-1328 & 77-1318), cert. filed in advance of judgment, 46 U.S.L.W. 3634 (U.S. April 4, 1978)
(No. 77-1411); Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 227 N.L.R.B. 1178 (1977); Diocese of Ft. WayneSouth Bend, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1226 (1976), enforcement denied sub nom. Catholic Bishop v.
N.L.R.B., 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1231 (1978); Cardinal Timothy
Manning, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1976), petition pending, (9th Cir. No. 77-1286); Roman Catholic
Diocese, 222 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1976); Roman Catholic Diocese, 221 N.L.R.B. 831 (1975); Catholic Bishop, 220 N.L.R.B. 359 (1975), enforcement denied, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 1231 (1978); Henry M. Hald High School Ass'n, 216 N.L.R.B. 512 (1975);
Henry M. Hald High School Ass'n, 216 N.L.R.B. 480 (1975); Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 216
N.L.R.B. 249 (1975); Henry M. Hald High School Ass'n, 213 N.L.R.B. 463 (1974); Henry M.
Hald High School Ass'n, 213 N.L.R.B. 415 (1974); Diocese of Ft. Wayne-South Bend, Inc.,
Nat'l Cath. Rep., Jan. 20, 1978, at 2, col. 3 (NLRB AL); see also Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 204 N.L.R.B. 159 (1973).
149. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) and 158(a)(1) (1970) [Hereinafter referred to in the text as the
NLRA].
150. Diocese of Ft. Wayne-South Bend, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1226 (1976); Catholic Bishop,
220 N.L.R.B. 359 (1975).
151. 559 F.2d 1112, 1131; accord, Caulfield v. Hirsch, 46 U.S.L.W. 2025 (E.D. Pa. July 7,
1977), appealspending (3rd Cir. Nos. 77-1328 & 77-1318), cert. filed in advance of judgment, 46
U.S.L.W. 3634 (U.S. April 4, 1978) (No. 77-1411); see Comment, The FreeExercise Clause, The
NLRA, and ParochialSchool Teachers, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 631 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
ParochialSchools].

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

opinion is disturbing, especially the way in which the court managed to
offend Catholics while protecting their rights. This discussion will review
several such troublesome aspects of the opinion, and then suggest a more
general approach to the central issue. The analysis will be kept within
manageable bounds by assuming that the relevant Supreme Court decisions
are correct.
A.

The Supreme Court Precedents

Controlling Supreme Court decisions indicate that when neutral regulation interferes with religious practice, the citizen's interest in continuing the
religious practice must be balanced against the government's interest in
regulation. 15 2 Sometimes this balancing has led to the conclusion that the
free exercise clause requires an exemption from regulation 153 and sometimes
not; 154 no clear standard has emerged. In the century since the first free
152. See generally Parochial Schools, supra note 151, at 662-71; Killilea, Standards for
Expanding Freedom of Conscience, 34 U. Prrr. L. REV. 531, 533-38 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Killileal; Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEO. L.J. 1115 (1973); Kurland, The
Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W.
VA. L. REV. 213 (1973); Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327
(1969); Dodge, The Free Exercise of Religion: A Sociological Approach, 67 MICH. L. REV. 679
(1969); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part L The
Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381 (1967) thereinafter cited as Giannella];
Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 217
[hereinafter cited as Galanter].
153. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (compulsory education); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 403-09 (1963) (unemployment compensation for Sabbatarians); Follett v. Town of
McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (taxation); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)
(same); Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (same); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418
(1943) (restrictions on prosletyzing); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (same); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (same); cf. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (test oath
for public official); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (flag salute)
(decided on free speech grounds); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (restrictions
on prosletyzing) (decided on free speech grounds); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147
(1939) (same); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (same); Pierce v. Society of the
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (compulsory public
education) (decided on substantive due process grounds).
154. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461-62 (1971) (compulsory military service);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday closing laws); Heisler v. Board of Review,
343 U.S. 939 (1952) dismissing mem. for want of substantial federal question appeal from 156
Ohio St. 395, 102 N.E.2d 601 (1951) (unemployment compensation for Sabbatarian); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. City of
Porterville, 338 U.S. 805, dismissing mem. for want of substantial federal question appealfrom
90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823 (1949) (zoning); Bunn v. North Carolina, 336 U.S. 942,
dismissing mem. for want of substantial federal question appealfrom State v. Massey, 229 N.C.
734, 51 S.E.2d 179 (1949) (snake handling); In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 569-73 (1945) (denial
of bar admission to conscientious objector to military service); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944) (restrictions on prosletyzing); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)
(same); Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (flag salute); Coleman v. City of
Griffin, 302 U.S. 636 (1937) dismissing mem. for want of substantial federal question appeal
from 55 Ga. App. 423, 189 S.E. 427 (1936) (same); Hamilton v. Board of Regents of the
University, 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (compulsory military training in state university); United States
v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623-24 (1931) (compulsory military service) (dictum); Selective
Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1918) (compulsory military service); Davis v. Beason,
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exercise challenge to regulation, the Courts' balancing has become more
explicit and more favorable to conscience-based claims for exemption.
Concern has been expressed that such exemptions discriminate against nonbelievers, 155 but the Court has never held that such an exemption violates the
establishment clause. 156 Internal church affairs are also protected from
government interference. One line of cases prevents secular courts from
reviewing the judgments of ecclesiastical courts; 157 another limits state
the use of financial aid given to religious institutions for
power to monitor 58
purposes.'
secular
Analysis of Catholic Bishop must draw on each of these lines of
authority. The bishops soughf exemption from neutral regulation, but not on
the customary basis of conscientious objection to compliance. They did not
is immoral, but rather that it would interfere
claim that collective bargaining
59
with internal church affairs.1
B.

The Seventh Circuit's Opinion

Judge Pell's opinion for the Seventh Circuit is not easily summarized.
Indeed, another commentator's understanding of the opinion differs significantly from the one offered here. "6 Part of the problem is the ponderous
133 U.S. 333 (1890) (polygamy); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161-67 (1878) (polygamy); cf. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946) (polygamy) (decided on mens rea
grounds); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory vaccination) (challenged
on substantive due process grounds).
155. TWA, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 80-85 (1977); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333, 338-40 (1970) (plurality opinion); id. at 344-61 (Harlan, J., concurring); Walz v. Tax
Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 700-27 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163, 165 (1965); id. at 188 (Douglas, J., concurring); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 22-26, 96 (1961); for suggested solutions, see Giannella, Religious Liberty,
Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part I. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81
HARV. L. REV. 513 (1968); Galanter, supra note 152 at 288-95.
156. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972) (compulsory education);
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 448-60 (1971) (military service); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (taxation); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,409-10 (1963) (unemployment compensation for Sabbatarians); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1918)
(military service); see also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 371-72 (1970) (White, J.,
dissenting) (military service).
157. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 6%, 708-15 (1976); Maryland
& Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God, 3% U.S. 367, 368-70 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445-52 (1969); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian
Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 114-16 (1952); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728-29
(1871).
158. New York v. Cathedral Academy, 98 S. Ct. 340 (1977); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229 (1977); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (plurality opinion);
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 745-49 (1973); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 684-89 (1971) (plurality opinion); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971).
159. See 559 F.2d 1112, 1122-24; see also ParochialSchools, supra note 151, at 662-64.
160. ParochialSchools, supra note 151, at 637, 653-57.
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prose; some of the meaning is irretrievably lost in ambiguity. More confusion arises from the court's refusal to distinguish the free exercise clause
from the establishment clause, and the refusal to state which clause the court
relied on for which conclusions. This refusal was based on the court's
"belief that there has been some blurring" and that both clauses have "the
identical purpose of maintaining a separation between Church and State." 161
The fact that there has been some blurring does not justify obliteration
of all distinctions. The effect of the court's stated approach would be to
substitute a separation clause for the existing free exercise and establishment
clauses. But separation is not a sufficient principle of decision. As the court
acknowledged, "total separation" is impossible. 162 Additional principles
must be brought to bear to decide which contacts between church and state
should be permitted and which forbidden. With only a separation clause, the
court would have to find or create such principles on its own; separate
attention to the free exercise and establishment clauses is necessary to
identify the concerns most important to the framers. Not surprisingly, there
are elements of free exercise and establishment clause doctrine in the
opinion. But the court's failure to identify them as such creates uncertainty
about the following summary of the court's reasoning.
What appears to be the court's main ground of decision, and the only
ground which will be analyzed in depth here, can only be based on the free
exercise clause. Teaching in Catholic schools, even in secular subjects, was
held to be part of the religious mission of the church, subject to exclusive
control by the bishops. 163 The court said it would violate the religion clauses
to force bishops to share this control with anyone else, such as a union. The
court also said that the Board would inevitably have to decide questions of
religious doctrine and become entangled in religious affairs,164 and this may
have been intended as an independent ground. However, these comments
appear to have been offered to support the main holding as against the
Board's contention that it could avoid interfering with episcopal control of
religious matters.
There is nothing wrong with the main thrust of the court's argument; it
goes to the heart of the problem. But much is wrong with the tone of the
argument and with its details. Every respondent in a small and very nonrandom sample of practicing Catholics was offended by the opinion, and
especially by the following paragraph taken from Loraine Boettner's Roman
Catholicism:165
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

559 F.2d at 1131.
Id. at 1124.
Id. at 1120-22.
Id. at 1125-26.
L. BoETrNER, ROMAN CATHOLICIsM 360 (1962) [hereinafter cited as BOETrNER].
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In the parochial schools Roman Catholic indoctrination is included
in every subject. History, literature, geography, civics, and science are given a Roman Catholic slant. The whole education of the
child is filled with propaganda. That, of course, is the very purpose of such schools, the very reason for going to all of the work
and expense of maintaining a dual school system. Their purpose is
not so much to educate, but to indoctrinate and train, not to teach
Scripture truths and Americanism, but to make loyal Roman Catholics. The children are regimented, and are told what to wear,
what to do, and what to think. 166
Whether that statement is true is an empirical question to which no sure
answer is presently available. But the court cites no evidence in the record to
support it, and there is little support for it in the few broadly based empirical
167
studies of Catholic education.
Even if the statement is denotatively true, it is a connotative disaster.
"Slant," "propaganda," "indoctrinate," and "regimented" are loaded
words; they put the alleged situation in the worst possible light. To base a
decision on a suggestion that Catholic schools do not teach "Scripture
truths" is for a secular court to take sides in debate among religious sects
over the meaning of the Bible. And to suggest that those schools do not
teach "Americanism" is to resurrect historic charges about Catholic patriotism that were supposed to have been buried with the election of John
Kennedy in 1960. The insinuation that Catholics may not be loyal Americans is heightened by immediate contrast with the schools' purpose of
making "loyal Roman Catholics."
It is obvious that the court took the quote from a concurring opinion by
Mr. Justice Douglas 168 and never examined Boettner's book itself. Had it
done so, it would have discovered that it was relying on an elaborate hate
tract. Here are some of Boettner's other comments on Catholic education:
The record is clear that an undue proportion of the gangsters,
racketeers, thieves, and juvenile delinquents who roam our big
city streets come, 69not from the public schools, but from the
parochial schools. 1
Many American Catholic children are being taught by ignorant
European peasants . . . Too often their teachers are nuns who

know nothing of American democracy or American institutions,
166. 559 F.2d at 1122 n.12 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 635 n.20 (1971)
(Douglas, J., concurring) quoting L. BOETTNER, ROMAN CATHOLICISM 360 (1962)).
167. A. GREELEY, W. MCCREADY & K. MCCOURT, CATHOLIC SCHOOLS IN A DECLINING
CHURCH (1976) [hereinafter cited as GREELEY, MCCREADY & MCCOURT]; A. GREELEY & P.
Rossi, THE EDUCATION OF CATHOLIC AMERICANS (1966) [hereinafter cited as GREELEY &
RoSSI]; R. NEUWIEN, CATHOLIC SCHOOLS IN ACTION (1966) [hereinafter cited as NEUWIEN]; see

id. at 145-226 (findings suggesting that many students in Catholic schools understand religion in
a way which reflects reasoning rather than indoctrination).
168. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 635 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
169. BOETTNER, supra note 165, at 370.

420

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

who cannot speak gramatically even in their own tongue ....
The need of private tutoring before they are able to meet matriculation requirements at standard colleges and universities is a

common experience for Catholic students. 70

Add to this the fact that 90 percent of the teaching in the parochial
school is done by brain-washed nuns and priests who throughout
their lives are kept in a rigid mental straight jacket. . . under the

absolute authority of one man, the bishop of the diocese ....

171

Another series of events to which we must call attention, which
surely cannot be pure coincidence, is that of the assassination of
three presidents of the United States, all three of whom72 were

killed by Roman Catholics educated in parochial schools.

Boettner's views on Roman Catholicism generally are capsulized by
the following: "Our American freedoms are being threatened today by two
totalitarian systems, Communism and Roman Catholicism. And of the two
in our country Romanism is growing faster than is Communism and is the
173
more dangerous since it covers its real nature with a cloak of religion."'
These samples are representative of the book. She recommends that practicing Catholics not be allowed to teach in public schools 174 or hold high public
75
office. 1
The debate over judicial use of published social scientific evidence has
flourished since Brown v. Board of Education,176 and the general issue is
170. Id. at 371, (quoting with approval from Montano, ChristianHeritage (May 1959) (no
further citation given); but see GREELEY, MCCREADY & MCCOURT, supra note 156, at 195-205
(finding that graduates of Catholic schools have slightly higher levels of occupational and
educational achievement than otherwise similar graduates of public schools); GREELEY &
Rossi, supra note 167, at 138-57 (same); NEUWIEN, supra note 167, at 67-79 (performance of
Catholic school students on standardized examinations above national norms); id. at 113-44
(description of training of teaching priests and nuns).
171. BOETTNER, supra note 165, at 371-72; cf. 559 F.2d at 1122 (quoted in text accompanying note 180 infra; but see NEUWIEN, supra note 167, at 83, 103 (more than 30% of Catholic
school faculty neither priests, brothers nor nuns); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,668 (1971)
(White, J., concurring and dissenting) (predicting, apparently on basis of record, that by 1976
majority of teachers in Rhode Island Catholic schools would be lay, apparently not including
nuns within lay category); Greeley, Who ControlsCatholicEducation?, 9 EDUC. & URB. SOC'Y
147 (1977) (suggesting that bishops' actual control over Catholic education quite limited)
[hereinafter cited as Who ControlsCatholic Education ]; ParochialSchools, supra note 15 1, at
644-45 (citing argument by Archdioceses of Philadelphia and Los Angeles that canon law gives
parish priest primary responsibility for temporal and spiritual guidance of parish school).
172. BOETTNER, supra, note 165 at 399.
173. Id. at 3.
174. Id. at 372.
175. Id. at 421.
176. 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 n. 11(1954); see, e.g., P. ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT & SOCIAL
SCIENCE (1972); Clark, The Social Scientists, the Brown Decision, and Contemporary Confusion in ARGUMENT (L. Friedman ed., 1969); Steli v. Savannah-Chatham Bd. of Educ., 220 F.
Supp. 667 (S.D. Ga. 1963), rev'd, 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964); Clark, The DesegregationCases:
Criticism of the Social Scientist's Role, 5 VILL. L. REV. 224 (1960); Ball, Lawyers and Social
Scientists-Guidingthe Guides, 5 VILL. L. REV. 215 (1960); Cahn, Jurisprudence,30 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 150 (1955).
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outside the scope of this article. But a court desiring to use such evidence
must at least take what steps it can to be sure the evidence is reliable. Had
Boettner testified in person, any competent cross-examiner would have
shown her pervasive bias and utterly discredited her.
To rely on such a source in any case is error. But to rely on such a
source with respect to religion raises special problems. Judicial citation of
Boettner's book lends legitimacy to it. Such governmental sponsorship of
anti-Catholic propaganda, even if inadvertant, tends to establish the other
religions.
The Boettner quote, together with other quotations from the Supreme
Court's cases on financial aid to Catholic schools, supported the first step of
77
the court's argument: that Catholic schools are pervasively religious.'
Fortunately, the court's holding did not depend on portraying Catholic
schools as centers for the brainwashing of the next generation. It was only
necessary to conclude that Catholic education is an integral part of the
religious mission of the church, and that could have been done in much
more restrained and less offensive language.
The second step in the court's argument was to find, not implausibly,
that collective bargaining by teachers tends to reach into every aspect of
educational policy and to directly affect the role of the school. 178 The third
step was to find this inconsistent with church law, which, according to the
79
court, requires the bishops to have absolute authority over the schools. 1
The court said:
All of these essentially patricentric schools are completely subject
to the authority of the respective bishops who have the right of
vigilance as to faith and morals and direct authority as regards
religious instruction. The bishops operate the schools through
functionaries who are completely subservient to the bishops' authority . . . . [If there were mandatory bargaining,] no longer
would the bishop be the sole repository of authority as required by
church law. Canon 1381.180
In this passage, the court did what it later suggested would be unconstitutional if done by the Board-it passed judgment on a question of church
doctrine. Episcopal control over church schools is theoretical at best. '8 ' The
extent of the bishops' authority generally has been a major subject of debate
in the Catholic church since the work of Cardinal Newman in the last
177. 559 F.2d at 1120-22.
178. Id. at 1123-24.
179. Id. at 1122.
180. Id. at 1122-23.
181. Who Controls Catholic Education?, supra note 171; ParochialSchools, supra note
151, at 644-45.
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century,' 82 and, to some extent, for much longer than that. 183 It isinappropriate for a secular court to take sides in that debate, 184 and it was unnecessary
for the court to do so. It was enough that the church must have authority to
determine matters of faith and morals and decide for itself how best to
impart its values to students; it was not necessary to locate that authority
within the church. Canon law was irrelevant to the bishops' claim. The
result should not have been different if the schools were run by a sect which
places church authority in each congregation of believers. To say that the
form of church organization or the details of church law matter is to
authorize discrimination among denominations. Rather, the court's point
must be that the right to free exercise of religion is denied when a church is
required to share decision making authority over part of its religious mission
with an organization from outside the church.
The court's reasoning up to this point had followed the analytic
framework of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 185 the most recent Supreme Court case
on free exercise claims to exemption from regulation. Under Yoder, the last
step in the court's analysis should have been a determination of whether
some state interest "of the highest order and . . not otherwise served can
overbalance" 1 86 the restriction on the church's right to internal control of its
schools. The court substantially omitted this step. It did note that not all
government interference with church schools is forbidden, and distinguished
187
collective bargaining from a few examples of permissible interference.
But it picked the easiest examples and avoided any hard comparisons.
Collective bargaining is different from "fire inspections, building and
zoning regulations, and state requirements under compulsory school-attendance laws,' ' 188 because, at least in the context of Catholic schools, those
regulations do not interfere with church control of religious belief and
instruction.
A better test of the court's theory than fire inspections is state regula182. Newman, On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine, RAMBLER (July 1859),
revised and reprinted in part in J. NEWMAN, THE ARIANS OF THE FOURTH CENTURY 445-68 (4th
ed. 1876). Both versions have been reprinted with a helpful introduction in J. NEWMAN, ON
CONSULTING THE FAITHFUL IN MATTERS OF DOCTRINE (Coulson ed. 1961). See generally, e.g., R.
MCBRIEN, THE REMAKING OF THE CHURCH: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM (1973); G. LEASE,
WITNESS TO THE FAITH: CARDINAL NEWMAN ON THE TEACHING AUTHORITY OF THE CHURCH
(1971); W. PATTERSON, NEWMAN: PIONEER FOR THE LAYMAN (1968); S. FEMIANO, INFALLIBILITY

OF THE LAITY: THE LEGACY OF NEWMAN (1967); W. ABBOTT, ed., The Documents of Vatican II,
especially 9-106, 486-525 (1966); J. GUITTON, THE CHURCH AND THE LAITY (1965); H. KUNG,
STRUCTURES OF THE CHURCH (S. ATrANASIO trans. 1964).
183.
184.

G. THILS, L'INFAILLIBILITE DU PEUPLE CHRETIEN "IN CREDENDO" (1963).
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393

U.S. 440 (1969); see generally supra note 157.
185. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
186. Id. at 215.
187. 559 F.2d at 1124.
188. Id.
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tion of curriculum. Illinois, for example, effectively requires Catholic
schools to teach all the "branches of education" taught in the public
schools. 18 9 That law also requires a substantial sharing of authority with an
outside agency. The Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that reasonable
standards of this nature would be upheld. 190 It is therefore necessary to ask
why sharing control with the union is worse than sharing control with the
state.
The state's interference is arguably less than the union's. If the state's
interest is satisfied by setting reasonable minimum standards, the church
may be able to meet those standards and still have adequate freedom to teach
religion and religious values in its own way.' 9' By contrast, union bargaining demands affect schools more pervasively.
For example, unions are much more likely than the state to demand
more freedom for individual teachers. Three of the unfair labor practice
charges filed against one of the bishops were based on refusal to renew
teachers' contracts. 192 The bishop responded that one employee had been
terminated for teaching the sexual theories of Masters and Johnson to a
biology class, one for marrying a divorced Catholic, and one for refusing to
structure a religion class as directed by the school principal. The union
might also have approached these three disputes by demanding a contract
provision restricting the grounds for termination and making such terminations arbitrable.
Catholics will no doubt disagree as to whether the three terminations
described above serve the religious function of their schools. Indeed, Catholics disagree on the basic issue of whether these and other matters should be
negotiated with a union. Some Catholics think the bishops' position in this
litigation is inconsistent with papal affirmation of the moral right of workers
to organize.1 93 But all these issues are for Catholics to decide among
themselves. They should not be decided by Congress or the Board or a
union, unless the church voluntarily agrees to share its authority.
On the other side of the balance is the government's interest in regula189. The School Code § 26-1.1, ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 122, § 26-1.1 (1975).
190. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233, 236 (1972) (dictum); Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 245-47 (1968) (dictum); Meyerkorth v. Nebraska, 372 U.S. 705 (1963) dismissing
mem. for want of substantialfederal question appealfrom 173 Neb. 889, 115 N.W.2d 585 (1962);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (dictum); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943) (quoting with approval from Minersville School Dist. v.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting) (dictum)); Pierce v. Society of the
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (dictum).
191. Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating, on substantive due process
grounds, statute providing that German could not be taught).
192. 559 F.2d at 1125-26; see Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., Nat'l Catholic
Rep., Jan. 20, 1978, at 2, col. 3 (NLRB ALJ).
193. Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum (1891).
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tion. The state's interest in protecting children 194 and in assuring that the
next generation of citizens has a minimally acceptable education 195 is very
great. By contrast, the federal government's interest in regulating the
commerce affected by religious schools seems considerably less important. 196 Congress has chosen to exempt all governmental employers' 97
and all agricultural laborers 198 from the NLRA. These exemptions affect
much more commerce than would an exemption of religious schools. 199
That choice is not conclusive on the quite different question of whether a
particular exemption is constitutionally required. But it is important in
assessing the weight of the federal interest, because it indicates that
Congress does not consider it essential to subject every employer affecting
commerce to the NLRA. Because the church's interest is greater, and the
government's interest is less, Catholic Bishop is not inconsistent with the
state's power to set curricular standards.
C. Regulation of Church Labor Relations
Cases under other labor relations statutes also cast light on Catholic
Bishop. The Fair Labor Standards Act contains no exemption for churches
or religious schools. 2°° The initially obvious distinction between the FLSA
and the NLRA is that regulation of wages, hours, and child labor is less
likely to affect church decisions concerning faith, morals, values, and how
to teach them. But that distinction may not be determinative. Decisions
overlooked in Catholic Bishop illustrate the difficulties.
Application of the FLSA to newspapers was upheld over a free press
claim in Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co. 201 Its application to state
and local governments was upheld over a constitutional challenge based on
state sovereignty, inter-governmental immunity, and the tenth amendment
in Maryland v. Wirtz.202 However, Wirtz was overruled in National
League of Cities v. Usery. 203 The Court defined the issue as whether state
power to determine the wages and hours of employees is "essential to
194.
195.
196.
197.

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-70 (1944).
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221-34 (1972).
But see Parochial Schools, supra note 151, at 665.
29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970).

198.
199.

29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
Compare United States Bureau of the Census, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED

STATES: 1976 (97th ed. 1976), Table 418 ($480 billion spent by governments in 1974); and id.,
Table 1090 ($72.39 billion expenses of farm production in 1974), with id., Table 183 ($6.2 billion
spent by elementary and secondary private schools in 1974).
200. See 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1970), as amended (Supp. IV 1974); see also 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(4)
(Supp. IV 1974).
201. 327 U.S. 178, 184 (1946).
202. 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (overruled in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976)).
203. 426 U.S. 833, 840, 855 (1976).
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separate and independent existence" 204 of the states, and held that it is. The
Court said that its decision did not depend on the size of the financial burden
imposed by the FLSA, but rather on interference with the states' "authority
to make those fundamental employment decisions upon which their systems
for performance of [governmental] functions must rest.' '205 Mabee was not
cited.
Reasoning from Usery to Catholic Bishop is risky; two different
statutes and two different constitutional protections are involved. But unless
the establishment clause requires a different result, it would be difficult to
argue that the explicit protection of the free exercise clause gives churches
less freedom to manage their internal affairs than the truism of the tenth
amendment and the implied doctrine of inter-governmental immunity give
state and local governments. If "religious" is substituted for "governmental" throughout the Usery opinion, the result is a strong argument that it is
essential to the independent existence of the churches that they be able to
determine the wages and hours of employees who carry out their religious
functions. The church's interest in internal control of other working conditions, and especially of curriculum and pedagogy, is surely closer to the
heart of the free exercise clause than its interest in internal control of wages
and hours. Usery supports the result in Catholic Bishop.
This reasoning must be compared with Prince v. Massachusetts.2° 6
Prince was convicted under state child labor laws for permitting her daughter to sell religious tracts on the streets of Brockton, Massachusetts; the
Supreme Court affirmed. Both mother and child were ordained Jehovah's
Witness ministers who believed that it was the child's duty to sell the tracts
and that failure to do so would condemn her "to everlasting destruction at
Armageddon.' '207
Prince demonstrates that labor laws can constitutionally forbid conduct
which is central to the free exercise of religion, and thus raises doubts about
the result in Catholic Bishop. But the state interest at stake in Prince is the
interest in protecting children, the same interest that supports minimum
curricular standards. The Court in Prince attached great weight to this
interest,2°8 and in Yoder plausibly explained Prince as simply a case in
which the balance of interests tipped in favor of the state. 20 9 In Catholic
204. Id. at 845 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559,580(1911) quoting Lane County
v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869)).
205. Id.at 851.
206. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
207. Id. at 162-63; see also id. at 164 (making clear that the child's rights were asserted; the
narrower explanation of the case in Parochial Schools, supra note 151, at 667-68, is inexplicable).
208. 321 U.S. 167-69.
209.

406 U.S. 229-34.
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Bishop, both the state's interest and the church's interest are more attenuated than in Prince. As with all balancing tests, the ultimate comparison
is subjective. Prince does not undercut the analogy between Catholic
Bishop and Usery, because the child labor provisions of the FLSA were not
discussed in Usery.
The constitutionality of applying the FLSA to churches has not been
resolved in the Supreme Court, but there is a Seventh Circuit opinion,
Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp.210 The employees in Mitchell
worked in a church-owned printing plant. The printing plant was maintained
to supply religious pamphlets, leaflets, and magazines distributed by the
church "to glorify God, publish the full Gospel to every nation and promote
the Christian religion by spreading religious knowledge.'"211 Nearly 90% of
the plant's output consisted of such material. The remainder was apparently
ordinary commercial printing for various customers. The workers were paid
less than the minimum wage and were not paid the required premiums for
overtime. Some of the workers filed affidavits stating that they did not
consider themselves "mere wage earners," but had come to the plant to
help "in the work of the Lord." 2 12 The court upheld the statute, finding it
"a reasonable, non-discriminatory regulation," and finding the minimum
wage as essential to the "health and well-being" of these workers as to that
of any others.

2 13

Mitchell is distinguishable from Catholic Bishop because there was no
interference with the content of the publications. The FLSA simply made it
more expensive for the church to publish. The financial burden may have
reduced the amount of material published, but it did not interfere with the
church's discretion to decide where the cuts should be made.
However, the short shrift given the employees' attitude is troubling.
Presumably they could have volunteered to print tracts for free, 214 and that
makes it hard to see why they could not volunteer to do so for less than the
minimum wage. Moreover, Usery must be regarded as casting doubt on
Mitchell.
There has also been litigation over the application of employment
discrimination laws to religious organizations. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
originally permitted religious institutions to discriminate on the basis of
religion in the employment of persons to carry on their religious ac210. 210 F.2d 879 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1013 (1954); see also Pacific Union
Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Marshall, 98 S. Ct. 2 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., as Circuit
Justice).
211. 210 F.2d at 881.
212. Id.at 881, 884.
213.

Id. at 884, 885.

214.

See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1976).
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tivities.21 5 The 1972 amendments expanded the exemption to all of a
religious institution's activities. 2 16 However, the Act does not exempt
churches from the duty not to discriminate on the basis of race, sex, or
national origin. As written, the Act makes illegal the requirements that
Catholic priests be male and that Mormon priests be white.
There is one appellate decision under each version of the exemption.
Neither compels any particular result in Catholic Bishop, but both support
its conclusion that employees performing religious work are not wholly
subject to government regulation.
McClure v. Salvation Army 2 17 involved a complaint that a Salvation
Army officer had been discriminated against in pay and benefits on the basis
of sex, and discharged in retaliation for her complaints. The court concluded
that the alleged discriminations were "matters of church administration and
government and thus, of purely ecclesiastical cognizance," and that the
Civil Rights Act would be unconstitutional if applied to the case. 2 18 To
avoid the constitutional issue, the court construed the Act as not applying to
the relationship between a church and its ministers. 2 19 It was apparently
considered irrelevant that all Salvation Army officers are called ministers,
and that McClure had actually worked as a Welfare Casework Supervisor
and as a secretary in the Public Relations Department.22°
The second case is King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC.221 Federal Communication Commission rules forbid employment discrimination, 222 with an
implied exception for religious discrimination in employment "connected
with the espousal of the licensee's religious views." 223 King's Garden, a
religious organization operating two licensed radio stations, claimed the
right to refuse to hire non-Christians. King's Garden challenged the narrow
scope of the FCC's exemption, arguing that it should be controlled by the
Congressional policy, reflected in the Civil Rights Act, to exempt all hiring
by religious employers, and that any narrower exemption violated the free
exercise clause.
The court rejected both contentions. Moreover, it said in dicta that the
broad Civil Rights Act exemption confers benefits having nothing to do with
free exercise and is therefore probably invalid as an establishment, but that
215. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1970).
216. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (Supp. 11 1972).
217. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied as untimely filed, 409 U.S. 8% (1972).
218. 460 F.2d at 560.
219. Id. at 560-61.
220. McClure v. Salvation Army, 323 F. Supp. 1100, 1101-04 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
221. 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
222. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.125, 73.301 (1976).
223. King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC,498 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C.Cir. 1974); In re Nat'l Religious
Broadcasters, Inc., 43 F.C.C.2d 451 (1973); In re Anderson, 34 F.C.C.2d 937, 938 (1972).
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the original exemption limited to religious activities is constitutionally
required. Finally, the court said that King's Garden had forfeited the right to
control its internal affairs to the extent that it had sought out a broadcasting
license, and that the sect had "no constitutional right to convert a licensed
communication franchise into a church.' 224
D. An Attempt to Generalize
In each of these cases, the balancing process has been conducted ad
hoc. Discretionary judgment is the essence of balancing tests, and one must
be cautious of over-generalization. But discretion can be guided if factors
which make cases similar or different are identified, and if cases are grouped
according to such factors. Enough cases have been decided to reveal basic
fact patterns and permit tentative steps toward such grouping.
Three distinct questions must be answered to identify the variables
which determine the strength of a church's interest in exemption. In the
context of labor regulation, those inquiries require a determination of: (1)
what employees are affected by the regulation; (2) what aspects of control
over these employees are interfered with by the regulation; and (3) the
extent to which church control is superseded.
Some employees and some aspects of control are more central to the
free exercise of religion than others. The answers to the first two questions
may be ranked accordingly. These rankings will have some of the features
of a continuum, but there are identifiable situations which differ from each
other in kind, not merely in degree. Although there may be line-drawing
problems in difficult cases, these situations seem conceptually distinct,
especially with respect to the first question.
At least four kinds of employees may be affected by regulation:
employees of believers, employees of the church working in church-owned
commercial businesses, employees of the church performing jobs without
religious content in the church's religious operations, and employees of the
church performing jobs with religious content.
In the first category, employees of believers, the claim for exemption is
weakest. Here, the church itself is not regulated at all; the claim is that the
believer is conscientiously opposed to compliance. Free exercise claims to
exemption from the NLRA have been rejected, 2 2 5 although employees'
224. 498 F.2d at 60.
225. Hammond v. United Papermakers, 462 F.2d 174 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1028
(1972) (employee); Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
872 (1971) (employee); Gray v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 429 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1001 (1971) (employee); Cap Santa Vue, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(employer); Western Meat Packers, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 444, enforcement denied on other
grounds, 350 F.2d 804 (10th Cir. 1965) (employer); for criticism of these cases see Parochial
Schools, supra note 151, at 668-70.
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claims under the religion clause of Civil Rights Act have fared somewhat
better. 226
The second category is employees working in a church-owned
commercial business. Here the claim for exemption is stronger because the
church itself is being regulated, but the claim is still weak. Even the
sweeping language in Usery did not extend the FLSA exemption to workers
not involved in carrying out governmental functions. 227 A case in point is
Good Foods Manufacturingand ProcessingCorp. ,221 involving a commercial lamb processing plant owned by Muhammed's Temple No. 2 of the
Holy Temple of Islam. The Board rejected Good Foods' religious claim to
exemption from the NLRA, which seems right, but did so solely on the
authority of cases rejecting the claims of individual believers, which is
wrong. Good Foods was a harder case, because the free exercise clause
protects not only individual believers, but the institutional integrity and
229
independence of the organized churches.
The third category, employees of the church performing jobs without
religious content in the church's religious operations, is illustrated by
Mitchell, King's Garden, and arguably McClure. The printers who produce
religious literature in a church-owned plant, the technicians and engineers
who run a religious radio station, and the secretary or janitor in a church or
parochial school, are essential to the religious functions of the church. Here
the claim for exemption begins to become serious, especially if the analogy
to Usery is given any weight. 23° Usery emphasized the governmental
function of the agency which the employee served, thus including support
personnel in the exemption. 2 1 By contrast, King's Garden focused on the
religious content of each job, and apparently grouped support personnel
with the employees of church-owned commercial businesses. 232 Whatever
the ultimate result, this was error, for separate analysis is required.
McClure avoided the issue by focusing on plaintiff's status as a
minister rather than her work as a secretary. Consideration of the weight to
be given ministerial status raises troubling questions. Even where the minister is a secretary, or where a priest is a bureaucrat in the chancery, more than
226. Cooper v. General Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nor.
International Machinists v. Hopkins, 433 U.S. 908 (1977); Yott v. North American Rockwell
Corp., 501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974); but see Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., I1 F.E.P. 1441
(D. Ariz. 1976).
227. 426 U.S. 833, 852.
228. 195 N.L.R.B. 418, 418 (1972), enforced on other grounds, 492 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir.
1974).
229. See Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S.
94, 116 (1952); see generally cases cited in note 157 supra.
230. See text accompanying notes 203-214 supra.

231. 426 U.S. at 851-52.
232. 498 F.2d at 61.
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just a title is likely to be involved. Ministerial status may indicate a greater
or more permanent commitment to the church; it may indicate potential for
promotion or transfer to work unavailable to lay employees. Some churches
and orders are obligated to permanently support those they ordain, a
233
commitment with obvious relevance to laws designed to protect workers.
A ministerial title is at least strong evidence that the job is a religious one.
But the title cannot be conclusive. The courts must be wary of discriminating in favor of those religions which take literally the priesthood of
all believers, 234 and of cynical misuse of titles to gain exemptions that would
otherwise be unavailable.
The Supreme Court cases on ordained Jehovah's Witness proselytiz235
ers are not instructive. Proselytizing is so obviously a religious function
that ordination adds little to the claim. Prince is the only one of these cases
the Witnesses lost; it must be justified by the strength of the state's interests
and not by questioning the validity of the child's ordination.
The fourth category consists of church employees performing jobs with
religious content. Traditional priests and ministers are obvious examples, as
was the announcer on the religious radio program in King's Garden. But it
is hard, perhaps impossible, to provide a comprehensive definition. As a
starting point, any church employee who does one or more of the following
as an integral part of his job should be considered as having a job with
religious content: perform, lead, or participate in worship services, liturgies, sacraments, or other rituals; formulate, expound, preach, teach, explain, or exemplify doctrine, faith, morals, or values; counsel, advise,
absolve, console, or reassure individuals in light of the doctrines of the
religion; proselytize. There are some very hard cases. Consider an order of
nursing nuns running a major hospital for patients of all faiths, 2 36 or a
contemplative order of monks, supporting their monastery with a commercial business and providing an intensely religious environment for themselves.
The more religious content a job has, the stronger the church's claim
that its relationship with the employee should be exempt from regulation.
233. Cf. 26 U.S.C. § 1402(h)(1)(D) (1970) (requiring, as condition of exemption from social
security self-employment tax, that conscientious objector be member of sect with substantial
history of supporting its dependent members).
234. See I Peter 2:9; Revelations 5:10; C. EASTWOOD, THE ROYAL PRIESTHOOD OF THE
FAITHFUL: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE DOCTRINE FROM BIBLICAL TIMES TO THE REFORMATION
(1963); C. EASTWOOD, THE PRIESTHOOD OF ALL BELIEVERS: AN EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE
FROM THE REFORMATION TO THE PRESENT DAY (1960).

235. See Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 68 (1953); Follett v. Town of McCormick,
321 U.S. 573, 574 (1944); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 161 (1944); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943); Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 587 (1942),
vacated on rehearing, 319 U.S. 103 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 2%, 300 (1940).
236. See, e.g., Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
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That is the point of Catholic Bishop's unfortunately over-zealous efforts to
show the pervasive religiosity of Catholic schools. The centrality of the
question, and its essentially factual nature, emphasize the need for the court
to support its conclusion with evidence from the record. But that may be
impossible. As the court noted,2 37 to conduct a trial over the extent of
religious content in Catholic school teaching raises a separate set of first
amendment problems. It is troubling to envision every bishop being hailed
before an Administrative Law Judge and required to prove the extent to
which instruction has a religious perspective in each of the schools in his
diocese.
The Supreme Court's practice with respect to judicial inquiries into
religiosity has been erratic, and it has not carefully analyzed the issue in any
of its recent opinions. But several lines of authority, together with its most
recent decision under the religion clauses, suggest that such inquiries are to
be minimized. Secular courts cannot decide whether a religious belief is
true, 238 or whether it is the authoritative teaching of a particular sect .239
Most of the cases on financial aid to religious schools have been decided by
treating all Catholic elementary and secondary schools as pervasively religious without regard to the facts proven in each case. 24° This eliminates the
need to litigate religiously sensitive factual issues, 24 1 although the Court has
never offered that as a reason for its practice. The entanglement doctrine
developed in those cases prevents government from closely monitoring the
activities of religious institutions. 242 Although most of the cases have
contemplated that the executive branch would do the monitoring, a judicial
monitor would seem to raise similar concerns.
That inference has been confirmed in the most recent case, New York
v. Cathedral Academy. 24 3 The Court struck down a plan to reimburse
237. 559 F.2d at 1120.
238. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
239. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440 (1969).
240. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); id. at 391-92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 830 (1973); Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 767-68 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); id.
at 665-68 (White, J., concurring and dissenting); I N. DORSEN, P. BENDER & B. NEUBORNE,
POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 998 (4th ed. 1976); but see Levitt v.
Committee for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 476 (1973) (some attention
paid to district court's findings); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (placing burden
of proving that secular and religious education were intertwined in Catholic schools on plaintiffs who challenged textbook loan program); cf. Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426
U.S. 736, 758 (1976) ("record of thousands of pages" compiled with respect to religious
colleges); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 680-82 (1971) (careful attention to record evidence with respect to religious colleges).
241. Giannella, Lemon and Tilton: The Bitter and the Sweet of Church-State Entanglement,
1971 S. CT. REV. 147, 181-85.
242. See note 158 supra.
243. 98 S. Ct. 340 (1977).
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Catholic schools for the cost of preparing examinations to comply with
state-imposed testing requirements, in part because the plan contemplated
that the New York Court of Claims would prevent reimbursement for any
test with religious content. The Court said that "[t]he prospect of church and
state litigating in court about what does or does not have religious meaning
touches the very core of the constitutional guarantee against religious establishment, and it cannot be dismissed by saying it will only happen once.'"I"
Although that sweeping statement seems to vindicate the Seventh
Circuit's inclination to avoid close factual inquiry into the religious significance of instruction in Catholic schools, that conclusion cannot be so easily
reached. The Court will surely be forced to limit its statement in Cathedral
Academy. When two constitutional clauses refer explicitly to religion, the
courts must necessarily determine what constitutes religion within the meaning of those clauses. Thus, the Court found it necessary to satisfy itself in
Wisconsin v. Yoder that Amish objections to public secondary education
were "rooted in religious belief,''245 and in the selective service cases 2"
that registrants' conscientious objections were religious within the meaning
of the statute. 247 In each of these examples, despite its obvious misgivings,
the Court required litigation over what does and does not have religious
meaning. Presumably, Cathedral Academy means that litigation over the
meaning of religion is to be avoided where possible, and handled in ways
that minimize both judicial pronouncements concerning religious doctrine
and judicial interference with religious functions. That principle might lead
to exempting all church employees from regulation, to reduce the occasions
on which it is necessary to litigate over what jobs and functions have
religious content.
Whatever limits are ultimately placed on litigation over what is religious, 24 the line must be drawn neutrally. Having denied the church a
benefit on the ground that the extent of religious content in elementary and
secondary Catholic education cannot be litigated, the Court must apply the
same rule where the church seeks relief from a burden. It cannot require
litigation of what has religious meaning in Catholic Bishop if that is
forbidden in CathedralAcademy.
It follows that the Seventh Circuit was justified in accepting the
Supreme Court's characterization of Catholic schools as pervasively religious without insisting on detailed factual proof. That characterization leads
244. Id. at 346; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 2%, 305-07 (1940).
245. 406 U.S. at 215-16.
246. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965).
247. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1970).
248. For suggestions, see ParochialSchools, supra note 151, at 653-55; Killilea, supra note
152; Giannella, supra note 152, at 1416-21.
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directly to an answer to the first question suggested here-what employees
are affected by the regulation? Teachers in Catholic schools have jobs with
religious content. It is irrelevant that some teachers may make no effort to
assist the religious mission of the schools; litigation to identify such teachers
is forbidden because it is indistinguishable from litigation to identify the
examinations without religious content in CathedralAcademy.2 49 Moreover, as the pending unfair labor practice charges2 50 illustrate, the church may
seek to prevent teachers from interfering with the school's religious mission
even if it does not require all of them to actively assist it.
The second question relates to the aspects of control over the employees with which the state interferes. It is harder to clearly identify and rank
the possible answers to this question, but review of the decided cases
suggests four categories.
The first category consists of regulations which merely increase the
expense of operation, as in the case of minimum wage laws. The church's
interest is weakest here. Such burdens may reduce the total volume of
religious activity, but the church retains virtually complete control of the
activity it can still afford. Even a claim to exemption from the minimum
wage law must be taken seriously in light of Usery.251 But there is an
establishment clause concern not present in Usery: if low income religious
workers or their families become public charges, the effect is a subsidy to
the church that employed them.
The church's claim is much stronger with respect to the second category: regulations which interfere with the way in which church activities are
conducted. This is the primary effect of laws requiring collective bargaining. 252 Other labor regulations have similar, less direct, effects. Maximum
hours laws, overtime pay laws, and laws forbidding discrimination in wages
and benefits may have the primary effect of increasing expenses, and thus
look like they belong in the first category. But these laws also provide
financial incentives to restructure work assignments.153 In addition, antidiscrimination laws require secular tribunals to review the church's
comparisons of the responsibilities and difficulties of jobs and the skills and
qualifications of workers. This occurs even under wage discrimination
249. Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618-19 (1971); id. at 666-67 (White, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (invalidating financial aid to supplement salaries of teachers in
Catholic schools, on ground that it was impossible to assure that they would not inject religion
into secular subjects, despite district court finding that they did not do so).
250. See text accompanying note 192 supra.
251. See also Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (all striking down
taxation as applied to religious prosleytizing).
252. For a more detailed analysis of the effect of applying the NLRA to religious schools,
see ParochialSchools, supra note 151, at 642-62.
253. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 847-57 (1976).
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laws. 254 The effect is greater when the law forbids discrimination in any of
the "terms, conditions and privileges of employment.", 25 5 Thus, these laws
interfere with the conduct of church affairs, even though they are not as
intrusive as collective bargaining.
The third category consists of regulations which control who will
perform church functions. The most obvious examples are anti-discrimination laws as applied to hiring, firing, and job assignment. The NLRA also
affects this interest. Unions will normally demand that employees be discharged only for "good cause" and that all discharges be arbitrable; the Act
itself prohibits discrimination on the basis of unionism.2 56 Child labor laws
are in this category, as are maximum hour regulations if they have their
intended effect of forcing employers to spread the work among more
employees. 257

The fourth category of regulation, and the most intrusive, consists of
regulations that interfere with the decision whether to conduct the activity at
all. Most often, these would be regulations which forbid some church
activities altogether, but the category would also include taxing some
activities more heavily than others or otherwise creating incentives to
abandon certain activities. 258 It is difficult to think of an example in a labor
regulation context, although one might arise under the Occupational Safety
and Health Act .259 Examples from other contexts include prohibition of the
use of hallucinogenic drugs without an exception for bona fide religious
ceremonies,

260

prohibition of snake handling, 261 and restrictions on prosely-

tizing .262
The third question which must be considered is the extent to which
church control is superseded by the labor regulation. A maximum hour law
is much less intrusive than a Fair Employment Practices Commission order
to reinstate a defrocked priest. Though both restrict the church's freedom to
254. See, e.g., the Equal Pay Act, 42 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I) (1970).
256. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970); see ParochialSchools, supra note 151, at 649-58.
257. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 849 (1970).
258. See note 251 supra.
259. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
260. Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S.
6 (1969); United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968); State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599,
148 S.E.2d 565 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 917 (1967); People v. Woody, 61 Cal.2d 716, 394
P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964); State v. Big Sheep, 75 Mon. 219, 243 P. 1067 (1926); cf.
National Prohibition Act § 3, 41 Stat. 305, 308-09 (1919) (exempting "wine for sacramental

purposes").
261. See, e.g., State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179, appeal dismissed for want of
substantialfederal question sub nom. Bunn v. North Carolina, 336 U.S. 942 (1949); Lawson v.
Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942).
262. Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Cox v.
New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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select its own employees, the hour law leaves an enormous range of
discretion; the FEPC order leaves none. There are no analytically distinct
categories; the extent of interference is infinitely variable. But it is important to identify the extent of interference as a separate variable from the
aspect of control interfered with, particularly if one wants to compare
precedents. It will often be possible to make simple quantitative comparisons of the extent of interference in two cases involving the same aspect of
control. But such a comparison between cases involving two different
aspects of control may be like adding apples and oranges; courts must
recognize that a qualitative judgment is required before analysis can
proceed.
Had the Board been upheld, the extent of interference in Catholic
Bishop would have been great. The church would have had no power to
make unilateral decisions affecting "conditions of employment." 2 63 All
such matters would have been subject to mandatory bargaining, and the
union would have been authorized to coerce acquiescence in its demands to
the extent it had economic power to do so. The near certainty of unfair labor
practice charges and the likelihood of an arbitration clause would further
erode church control; the Board, the courts and the arbitrators would make
binding decisions on many issues.
This analysis supports the result in Catholic Bishop. The Board attempted to interfere with church control over employees carrying out an
important church function and whose jobs have religious content. The Board
would have interfered both with the church's control over how the work was
done and over who did it. The extent of interference would have been great.
All three variables indicate that mandatory collective bargaining with parochial school teachers would be a serious intrusion into church autonomy. This
intrusion is not justified by the government's interest in regulating church
labor relations.264 Nor would an exemption amount to an establishment
265
under present law.
The foregoing is offered as a tentative framework for analysis. It will
not decide hard cases or eliminate the need for sound judgment, and new
cases will likely reveal new situations that require expansion or revision.
But it is a start towards thinking systematically about church labor regulation.
263. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
264. See text accompanying notes 197-199 supra.
265. See note 156 supra; but see 559 F.2d 1131 (Sprecher, J.,concurring) (suggesting,
without explanation, that a partial exemption would be an unconstitutional preference for
religion although a total exemption would not be); see also ParochialSchools, supra note 151,
at 655-57.
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IV.
CONCLUSION

The substantive conclusions of the article are, of course, at the ends of
its three main divisions. The three cases discussed illustrate the importance
and complexity of litigation before the Seventh Circuit. They are not
unique; other cases of equal importance and complexity could have been
discussed instead. It is the regular flow of such cases that makes life exciting
for Seventh Circuit law clerks and Seventh Circuit critics, and, one might
speculate, for Seventh Circuit judges as well.

